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ABSTRACT: This Article presents an entirely novel approach to
prostitution reform focused on incremental market improvement facilitated
by information law and policy. Empirical evidence from the economics and
sociology of sex work shows that new, Internet-enabled, indoor forms of
prostitution may be healthier, less violent, and more rewarding than
traditional street prostitution. This Article argues that these existing
"Prostitution 2.0" innovations have not yet improved sex markets
sufficiently to warrant legalization. It suggests that creating a new
"Prostitution 3. 0" that solves the remaining problems of disease, violence,
and coercion in prostitution markets is possible, but would require removing
legal barriers to ongoing technological innovation in this context, such as
state laws criminalizing technologies that "advance prostitution." This
Article considers what Prostitution 3.0 might entail, how it might be
created, and whether it would succeed in remedying the ongoing problems in
prostitution markets.
INTRO DU CTIO N ............................................................................................... 1991
I THE FOUR PROBLEMS OF PROSTITUTION 1.0 ......................................... 1999
A. INFORMATIONASYMMETES .......................................................... 2001
B. NEGATIVEEXTERNALITIES .............................................................. 2003
C. COERCION ..................................................................................... 2004
D. OBJECTIONABLE COMMODIFICATION ............................................... 2005
II. THE INCOMPLETE IMPROVEMENTS OF PROSTITUTION 2.0 ..................... 2007
A. PROSTITUTION 2.0 'S TECHNOLOGIES .............................................. 2oo8
1. Low-Cost Advertising ............................................................ 2009
2. R eview of Sellers ................................................................... 20 11
3. Screening of Buyers ............................................................. 2013
B. THE IMPROVEMENTS OF PROSTITUTION 2. 0 .................................... 2016
• Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. Thank you to the faculty of Colorado




i. Effects on Information Asymmetries .................................. 2016
2. Effects on Negative Externalities ........................................ 2021
3. Effects on Coercion .............................................................. 2022
4. Effects on Objectionable Commodification ....................... 2024
C. THE REAmNING PROBLEMS WITH PROSTITUTION 2.0 ..................... 2027
1. Remaining Information Asymmetries & Externalities ...... 2028
2. Remaining Coercion ........................... 2030
3. Remaining Commodification .............................................. 2033
III. THE POSSIBILITIES OF PROSTITUTION 3.0 .............................................. 2034
A. PROSTITUTION 3.0'S TECHNOLOGIES .............................................. 2037
1. Verification of STD Status ................................................... 2037
2. Verification of Criminal History .......................................... 2038
3. Anti-Trafficking Analysis ...................................................... 2039
4. Biometric Identity Verification ........................................... 2041
B. INCREMENTAL PROSTITUTION 3 .o LEGAL REFORM .......................... 2043
1. Removing Legal Barriers to Innovation ............................. 2044
2. Regulating Prostitution 3.0 Intermediary Firms:
Confidentiality, Neutrality, Privilege & Reporting
Requirem ents ....................................................................... 2046
3. Tightening Existing Safe Harbors Over Time ................... 2051
4. Legalizing Prostitution 3.0 & Simultaneously
Criminalizing the Purchase of Sex Outside of
Prostitution 3.0 ..................................................................... 2052
C. FINAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST ............................................ 2053
i. The Problem of Unexpected Consequences ..................... 2056
2. The Problem of Remaining Street Prostitution ................. 2057
3. The Problem of Political Will .............................................. 2058
CO NCLUSION ....................................................................................... 2060
[Vol. 98:1989199o
PROSTITUTION 3 .o?
There is no strong evidence that prostitution is, at least in the United States and
certainly among its higher echelons, a more desperate exchange than, say, working in
Walmart.'
- Political Philosopher Debra Satz
What is wrong with prostitution cannot be fixed by moving it indoors. The same
harms are there whether she is in a trick's house, a back alley, his car, or a room at a
hotel.2
- Prostitution Scholar Melissa Farley
INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario. A potential customer contacts a
prostitute through her online advertisement. She agrees to meet with the
customer at his hotel room the following week, but first requires him to
submit his name and identifying information to a qualified Internet
intermediary. The intermediary uses that information to run analytics on the
customer. It checks that the customer has no history of crime or violence,
verifies the date and results of his last medical test for sexually transmitted
diseases ("STDs"), and confirms that no other prostitute has reported him
for misbehavior. The intermediary sends this information to the prostitute,
without including the customer's identifying information such as his name
or address. It simultaneously sends the client a de-identified report on the
prostitute, including information on her criminal history, health status, and
customer reviews. The intermediary also verifies that she is of age and has
not been trafficked by cross-checking her identity against government
records and other data. As soon as both parties review this information and
confirm their desire to proceed, the intermediary takes a fifty percent
deposit from the customer, which it holds in escrow. When the prostitute
and the client first meet the following week, they quickly conduct iris scans
of each other's eyes using a pocket device that connects to the prostitute's
mobile phone. The intermediary uses this biometric information to confirm
that each is the actual person whom the firm verified and the other agreed
to meet. Neither knows the other's name, but each knows that the other is a
safe, healthy, and uncoerced counterpart. Each knows that the intermediary
is legally obligated to maintain their confidences, but is also obligated to
reveal their identities to law enforcement if their interaction is marred by
i. DEBRA SATZ, WHY SOME THINGS SHOULD NOT BE FOR SALE: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
MARKETS 141 (2010). The term "desperate exchange" comes from Wazer's treatment of
market inalienabilities. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OFJUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQUALITY 102 (1983) ("Desperate exchanges, 'trades of last resort,' are barred, though the
meaning of desperation is always open to dispute.").
2. Melissa Farley, Prostitution Harms Women Even if Indoors, 11 VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN
950, 962 (2005) (reply to Ronald Weitzer, Flawed Theory and Method in Studies of Prostitution, I I
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 934 (2 005)).
2013] 1991
IOWA LAW REVIEW
violence, fraud, or disease transmission. Finally, each also knows that if-and
only if-they use this system, their sexual transaction is legal.
Such a technology-enabled sex market-"Prostitution 3.o"-could keep
buyers and sellers of sex safer and healthier by reducing violence, blackmail,
and STD transmission. It could help prostitutes by deterring "no shows" and
non-paying customers. It could reduce illegal trafficking and coerced
prostitution by screening prostitutes for age and legal status, and by using
biometric identification to confirm that the prostitute the client hired
online was in fact the same individual who appeared in person. It could
enable and encourage prostitutes and clients to find and engage each other
off the streets and out of view. It could preserve anonymity for both
prostitutes and customers, allowing them to avoid social stigma and
maintain privacy. It could be conducted by a private (perhaps non-profit)
firm, not the government, greatly reducing the risk to either party that the
state might in some way exploit the information provided. And it could
incentivize participation in the system: not only would transactions outside
of Prostitution 3.0's parameters remain illegal, they would remain
uninformed. Many-perhaps most-sex buyers and sellers would want to
participate in order to gain the safety, health, and other informational
benefits the system would provide.
This Article explores whether we could and should create Prostitution
3.o. This is not a technological problem, however, but a legal one. The
technologies needed to effect such a system exist already, at least in nascent,
"beta" forms. A few are in use today by prostitutes and clients who use
Internet tools to find, screen, and review each other online-what some
have called "Prostitution 2.o."3 The remaining technologies could be
deployed with sufficient investment and encouragement. The law, however,
is hostile to such innovation.4 It currently criminalizes not just prostitution
itself, but activities-including technologies-that advance or facilitate sex
markets. As a result, Prostitution 3.0 is unlikely to emerge without legal
reform to clear the way for technology to improve these markets. This
Article thus presents the possibility of an entirely novel incremental
prostitution reform agenda to give prostitution markets that freedom to
improve.
Consider two introductory examples. First, in 2oo6, the Bill and
Melinda Gates Foundation bought 500 "smart cards" for prostitutes in
3. See infra Part II (defining and discussing Prostitution 2.0). I borrow the term
"Prostitution 2.0" from Scott Cunningham & Todd D. Kendall, Prostitution 2.o: The Changing
Face of Sex Work, 69J. URB. ECON. 273 (201 1).
4. There is very little scholarship on the problem of innovation in an illegal market. See,
e.g., Georgina Voss, The Dynamics of Technological Change in a Stigmatised Sector 8 (Jan. 4,
2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www2.druid.dk/conferences/viewpaper.
php?id=1o72&cf=lo ("[The sex] sector has remained almost entirely unexamined in the
economic, industrial and innovation literatures .. ").
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Mysore, India.5 Each card contained an embedded computer chip that
granted its owner discounts at shops and hotels.6 If a prostitute received a
quarterly medical exam, including tests for STDs, her card continued to
work.7 If not, the card de-activated s The Foundation sought to experiment
with technology to improve the health and welfare of prostitutes. Had this
experiment taken place in the United States, however, it would almost
certainly have violated various state statutes that criminalize "advancing"
prostitution.9 Moreover, the Internal Revenue Service has long maintained a
policy of stripping tax-exempt status from non-profits that engage in or aid
illegal activities,' obviously a deterrent for a foundation considering such
work.
Second, consider Qpid, a rapidly expanding Internet firm that provides
STD verification services to those in the regular dating market." Qpid
verifies that a potential partner has recently tested negative for common
STDs. A Qpid user authorizes the Internet service to collect her verified test
results from her doctor or testing center. She can then give her Qpid code
to a potential partner, and that partner can text the code to the service to
receive instant notification of the results and date of the user's most recent
STD testing.12 It is easy to imagine that Qpid could modify its service to
target prostitutes and clients, thereby providing one of the components of
Prostitution 3.o discussed in the introductory hypothetical above. If Qpid
extended its service to prostitution markets, however, or even if a large
number of prostitutes and clients used its service, Qpid could face legal
action. In the last decade, prosecutors and lawmakers have actively targeted
prostitution-related innovations, including online advertisers that allow
prostitutes to avoid streetwalking (such as Craigslist'3 and Backpage'4),
online "review sites" that allow customers to exchange information about





9. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 230.15(1) (McKinney 2oo8) (criminalizing acts that
"[a]dvance prostitution," including by "knowingly causling] or aid[ing] a person to commit or
engage in prostitution.... or engag[ing] in any other conduct designed to institute, aid or
facilitate an act or enterprise of prostitution" (internal quotation marks omitted for first
quotation)). Many other state statutes contain similar provisions. See infra Part III (discussing
such laws).
lo. See infra Part III (discussing these legal barriers to innovation).
11. See QPID.ME, http://www.qpid.me (last visited Mar. 1, 2013) (advertising its mission as
"Spread the Love, Nothing Else").
12. To try the service, enter your mobile phone number on the website's home page to
receive the most recent test results of the site's founder, Ramin Bastani. See id.
13. See CRAIGSLIST, http://www.craigslist.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
14. SeeBACKPAGE.cOM, http://www.backpage.com (last visited Mar. 1, 2013).
2013] 1993
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prostitutes (such as The Erotic Review'5 or PunterNet,6 ), and nascent online
customer verification services (such as Date-Check'7 and
RoomService2000,
8 ).,9
These examples illustrate the conundrum of innovation in an illegal
market. New technologies may be able to improve prostitution markets by
making prostitution safer, healthier, and less socially offensive. Such
technologies must contend with an environment hostile to innovation,
however. The state attacks these new technologies because they aid those
participating in an illegal trade. In the narrow sense, such prosecution may
be justified by existing statute. In a broader sense, however, it creates a
chicken-and-egg problem. The first versions of such new technologies-such
as Craigslist, The Erotic Review, or even Qpid-are predictably imperfect. If
allowed to develop over time, however, such innovations may ultimately so
improve sex markets that such markets would deserve legalization. Hence
the problem: a liberal state committed generally to freedom of contract
justifies restricting such freedom in one domain-prostitution-because of
its special market and moral failures; innovation can remedy those failures,
thus removing the justification for prohibition, but innovation is stymied by
the very prohibition it might ultimately overcome. Prostitution markets will
never improve in such an environment.
Even considering a reform agenda to create Prostitution 3.0 is thus
complex, novel, and controversial. Its complexity derives from the need to
draw from many sources: the economics-o and political philosophy- of
15. SeeTHE EROTIC REVIEW, http://www.theeroticreview.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
16. See PUNTERNET, http://www.punternet.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
17. See DATE-CHECK, http://www.date-check.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (providing
an online system to verify credentials of potential prostitution customers).
18. See ROOMSERVICE2OOO, http://www.roomservice2ooo.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013)
(same); see also PREFERRED 4 11, http://www.preferred4l1.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013)
(same).
19. See infra Part III (discussing the ways in which law enforcement has pursued such
services).
20. See, e.g., Lena Edlund & Evelyn Korn, A Theory of Prostitution, I11o J. POL. ECON. 181
(2002) (proposing an opportunity cost theory where prostitutes are paid relatively high wages
for unskilled labor to compensate for the opportunity cost of being unable to enter the
marriage market); Raj Arunachalam & Manisha Shah, Prostitutes and Brides?, 98 AM. ECON. REV.
516 (2oo8) (testing the hypothesis of Edlund and Korn); see also SAMUEL CAMERON, THE
ECONOMICS OF SIN: RATIONAL CHOICE OR No CHOICE AT ALL? (2002) (offering an alternate
theory focused on compensation for social costs of prostitution); MARINA DELLA GIUSTA ET AL.,
SEX MARKETS: A DENIED INDUSTRY (2OO8) (introducing a model incorporating stigma and
varied gender into economic analysis).
Economic analysis of prostitution is relatively new. See Scott Cunningham & Todd D.
Kendall, Prostitution, Technology, and the Law: New Data and Directions, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON THE ECONOMICS OF FAMILY LAW 2 21, 2 21 (Lloyd R. Cohen & Joshua D. Wright eds., 2011)
("Despite the importance of the phenomenon, economic analysis of sex work is in its infancy.");
Marina Della Giusta et al., Who Is Watching? The Market for Prostitution Services, 22 J. POPULATION
ECON. 501, 502 (2009) ("[U]ntil recently, economists have not been interested in analysing
[Vol. 98: 19891994
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prostitution; the new empirical study of technology's impact on
prostitution;22 the emerging field of information privacy and technology
law;'3 and contract law and theory."4 Although this Article discusses how
technology can address the challenges specific to prostitution, it is but one
example of how to conceive of and foster freedom of contract in a
technologically evolving world.25
This Article's novelty derives from its focus on the intersection of law,
technology, and market evolution in this unique context. Despite the fact
that roughly eighty percent of prostitution in the United States occurs
through online or indoor channels rather than via street prostitution,' 6 the
legal literature on prostitution has not seriously addressed this
phenomenon. This Article presents the first rich description in the legal
this type of human transaction."); Alys Willman, Let's Talk About Money, in SEX WORK MATTERS:
EXPLORING MONEY, POWER AND INTIMACY IN THE SEX INDUSTRY 143, 143 (Melissa Hope Ditmore
et al. eds., 2010) ("[D]espite its clear economic foundations, economists have traditionally had
little to say about the sex industry.").
21. See, e.g., MICHAELJ. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN'T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS
111-12 (2012) (discussing typical objections to free-market prostitution); SATZ, supra note 1
(providing discussion of noxious markets and prostitution reform); Lars 0. Ericsson, Charges
Against Prostitution: An Attempt at a Philosophical Assessment, 90 ETHICS 335 (198o) (initiating
over thirty years of debate over whether "sound" prostitution is possible with sufficient reform).
22. See generally Janet Lever & Deanne Dolnick, Call Girls and Street Prostitutes: Selling Sex and
Intimacy, in SEX FOR SALE: PROSTITUTION, PORNOGRAPHY, AND THE SEX INDUSTRY 187, 188
(Ronald Weitzer ed., 2d ed. 2010) (noting that escorts "have rarely been studied by
researchers"); Alexandra K. Murphy & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, Vice Careers: The Changing
Contours of Sex Work in New York City, 29 QUALITATIVE SOC. 129, 135 (20oo6) ("There have been
very few studies of women working indoors-especially those who work in the middle-income or
high-end range of sex work."); Juline A. Koken, Working in the Business of Pleasure: Stigma,
Resistance and Coping Strategies Utilized by Independent Female Escorts 1 (Feb. 2009)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The City University of New York) (on file with The Graduate
Center, The City University of New York) (describing "the strategies utilized by Internet escorts
to manage the stigma associated with sex work").
23. This Article is part of the nascent field wrestling with technology's implications for law,
society, and markets. See generally DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND
PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004); LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ, INFORMATION AND
EXCLUSION (2011); Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech:
Fostering Digital Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U. L. REv. 1435 (2011).
24. My argument relies heavily on the transaction cost economics of contract. For an
introduction to transaction cost economics, see Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics:
The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22J.L. & ECON. 233, 233 (1979) (describing institutional
economics as "preoccupied with the origins, incidence, and ramifications of transaction costs");
see also Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics, in HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL
ECONOMICS 41 (Claude Mfnard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2005) (providing an overview of the
field).
25. See Scott R. Peppet, Freedom of Contract in an Augmented Reality: The Case of Consumer
Contracts, 59 UCLA L. REV. 676, 745 (2012) (exploring the ways in which freedom of contract
and "contract doctrine is contingent on underlying technological and economic conditions").
26. See MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACr 39-40 (1993)
(citing statistics); Murphy & Venkatesh, supra note 22, at 137 (same).
2013]
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literature of Prostitution 2.o's technologies,27 the first discussion of the new
empirical evidence about the technologies' impact on prostitution markets,
and the first sustained analysis of how they should impact prostitution law
and policy. Its conclusion-that we need further innovation to create
Prostitution 3.o-is also novel, as is the focus on legal reform as a necessary
precursor to such innovation.
Its controversy derives from the sensitive subject matter of prostitution
and the need simultaneously to explain the argument and defend it against
likely critics. This approach will provoke and conflict with essentially all sides
in existing prostitution debateS: those who would legalize all forms of
prostitution;9 those who have recently argued that Prostitution 2.0'S
budding innovations suffice to make newer "indoor" forms of prostitution
justifiable;3o and, ultimately, those who assert that no form of prostitution
should be legalized, even if as improved as Prostitution 3.0.3' This Article
addresses these three central likely objections in turn, through its three
Parts.
Part I first focuses on traditional forms of prostitution-or "Prostitution
1.o." It articulates and explores the four most important objections to
27. The only legal scholarship focused primarily on the effects of the Internet on
prostitution is Robert Rigg, The Not-So-Risky Business of High-End Escorts and the Internet in the z st
Century, 17 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2010) (describing Internet advertising of prostitution and
arguing for new enforcement efforts).
28. In the last two decades, debate over prostitution has largely raged between
abolitionists critical of prostitution as an oppressive practice and institution, on the one hand,
and both liberals and feminists who see at least some forms of "sex work" as a means of
economic empowerment, on the other. See Scott A. Anderson, Prostitution and Sexual Autonomy:
Making Sense of the Prohibition of Prostitution, 112 ETHICS 748, 749 (2002) ("[L]iberals and
radical feminists have been locked in debate about how best to respond to the problems
associated with prostitution."); Jane E. Larson, Prostitution, Labor, and Human Rights, 37 U.C.
DAvIs L. REv. 673, 676-82 (2004) (discussing the "sex work model" and the "sexual
exploitation approach"); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Trafficking, Prostitution, and Inequality, 46
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 271, 272-74 (201 1) (distinguishing between the "sex work model" and
the "sexual exploitation approach").
29. See, e.g., Susan E. Thompson, Note, Prostitution-A Choice Ignored, 21 WOMEN'S RTs. L.
REP. 217, 237 (2000) (arguing that prostitution can be an empowering choice for women
seeking economic independence). The "sex work" position has many adherents, and may at this
point have become the dominant feminist position on the issue. See generally LAURA MARIA
AGUSTIN, SEX AT THE MARGINS: MIGRATION, LABOUR MARKETS AND THE RESCUE INDUSTRY
(2007); GLOBAL SEX WORKERS: RIGHTS, RESISTANCE, AND REDEFINITION (Kamala Kempadoo &
Jo Doezema eds., 1998).
30. See, e.g., RONALD WEITZER, LEGALIZING PROSTITUTION: FROM ILLICIT VICE TO LAWFUL
BUSINESS 54-57 (2O12) (calling for the legalization of indoor prostitution); Max Brantley,
Prostitution: A Career Choice, ARK. BLOG (May 12, 2o1, 6:26 AM), http://m.arktimes.com/
ArkansasBlog/archives/2o 1i/o5/1 2/prostitution-a-career-choice (reporting on a study from
the University of Arkansas advocating for legalization of indoor prostitution).
31. See, e.g., CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT 191-200 (1988) (noting that
"[t] he idea of sound prostitution illustrates the dramatic shift that has taken place in arguments
over prostitution" and rejecting such reforms); Farley, supra note 2, at 955 (rejecting the
possibility that new, Internet-enabled forms of prostitution deserve legalization).
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traditional street prostitution: (i) that street prostitution markets suffer
from information asymmetries that make them inefficient, unsafe, and
unhealthy; (2) that such markets create negative externalities, such as crime
and disease, for society generally; (3) that prostitutes participate in such
markets only because they feel coerced by violence or economic need, which
vitiates their consent; and (4) that such markets denigrate and commodify
women or sex in ways that damage our general social norms and practices.
Judging against these four criteria, Part I concedes that street prostitution is
too compromised a market to justify legalization.
Part II then turns to Prostitution 2.0. Part II.A first explores the ways in
which the Internet has already changed prostitution. It highlights three
technologies: (i) low-cost online advertisement; (2) interactive escort review
sites; and (3) verification of customers' credentials through the Internet.
Early empirical evidence indicates that these three core technologies have
made independent, indoor, escort-type prostitution safer, healthier, and
more humane than Prostitution 1.0.32 Part II.B thus argues that Prostitution
2.0 significantly improves traditional street prostitution. It partially remedies
each of the four objections to prostitution reviewed in Part I. At the same
time, Prostitution 2.0's successes remain incomplete. Part II.C therefore
concludes that, despite advances, Prostitution 2.0 fails to meet the four
criteria for legalization and argues against simply legalizing these new forms
of prostitution as they stand.
Part III explores the possibility of creating Prostitution 3.0. Part III.A
considers how four critical technologies missing from current forms of
prostitution could improve these markets:3s (x) verification of STD status;
(2) verification of criminal history and propensity to violence; (3)
verification of anti-trafficking credentials; and (4) biometric identity
verification.4 Part III.B explains the incremental law reform that would be
required to implement such technologies: first, removing legal barriers to
prostitution-related innovation; second, setting up a regulatory regime that
provides Prostitution 3.0 firms with confidentiality and neutrality
obligations, evidentiary privilege for the information they hold, and
32. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BERNSTEIN, TEMPORARILY YOURS: INTIMACY, AUTHENTICITY, AND
THE COMMERCE OF SEX 93 (2007) ("[T]he Internet has... reshaped predominant patterns of
sexual commerce in ways that some sex workers have been able to benefit from."). For a
discussion of these empirics, see infra Part II.B.
33. My argument is platform-neutral. I do not care, for example, whether Prostitution 3.0
employs iris-scanning technology versus fingerprinting, nor whether its information is delivered
through a mobile device or a home computer. The argument centers on types of information
that technology can create, verify, or transmit, not on the specific hardware or software
ultimately created to do so.
34. Prostitution 3.0 may include a variety of other technological advances, including
mobile, location-based services to bring such information to street prostitutes and sensor-based
disease detection to further improve public health. The four components listed here, however,
are its core. See infra Part III.A.
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reporting requirements in the event of violence or fraud; third, incentivizing
firms to innovate by tightening existing safe harbors35 that currently tolerate
technologies not quite up to Prostitution 3.0's standards; and finally,
legalizing Prostitution 3.o while continuing to criminalize the purchase of
sex outside of its improved parameters.
Finally, Part III.C considers not just the mechanics of whether we could
create Prostitution 3.o, but the more difficult question of whether we
should. I will admit to remaining somewhat tentative about strong
prescriptions at this early stage. My purpose is not to argue that Prostitution
3.0 would be an unqualified good, nor to assert without evidence that its
reforms would repair prostitution markets sufficiently to justify full
legalization or decriminalization. Instead, my goal is to show that existing
technological changes do not fully improve these markets, while
simultaneously challenging those interested in prostitution reform to
consider whether information and technology law and policy should be a
part of their debate and agenda. I lean towards pursuing Prostitution 3.0
reforms because of our social commitment to freedom of contract, which, in
my view, necessitates allowing markets-even or especially traditionally
suspect markets-to improve if they can. Nevertheless, Part III.C ends by
considering objections to the possibility of Prostitution 3.0, including the
problem of lack of political will.
Before we begin, two additional caveats. First, writing about prostitution
presents inherent difficulties. No neutral language exists: some oppose the
term "prostitution" as inherently stigmatizing or politicized;36 others dislike
the terms "sex work" and "sexual services" as overly sanitized.s7 Similarly, the
labeling of "clients," "customers," 'johns," or "prostitutors" creates its own
controversy.s8 Pronouns are also difficult.s9 I wish to sidestep these debates
35. E.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2oo6).
36. See Sylvia A. Law, Commercial Sex: Beyond Decriminalization, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 523, 525
(2000) (rejecting the use of "prostitute" or "prostitution"); Vanessa E. Munro & Marina Della
Giusta, The Regulation of Prostitution: Contemporary Contexts and Comparative Perspectives, in
DEMANDING SEX: CRITIcAL REFLECTIONS ON THE REGULATION OF PROSTITUTION 1, 6 (Vanessa E.
Munro & Marina Della Giusta eds., 2oo8) ("[Tlhe language of 'prostitute' and 'prostitution'
have been closely aligned with abolitionist perspectives that see the sale of sex as entailing
women's exploitation and objectification .... ").
37. See, e.g., SHEILA JEFFREYS, THE INDUSTRIAL VAGINA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE
GLOBAL SEX TRADE 8- 9 (2009) ("The use of the ordinary language of commerce in relation to
prostitution makes the harm of this practice invisible."). For a useful overview of the debate, see
Kate Sutherland, Work, Sex, and Sex-Work: Competing Feminist Discourses on the International Sex
Trade, 42 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 139, 150-54 (2004) (comparing the approaches of "radical
feminism" and "sex radicalism" to the term "sex-work").
38. See, e.g., Sheila Jeffreys, "Brothels Without Walls": The Escort Sector as a Problem for the
Legalization of Prostitution, 17 SOC. POL. 210, 212 (2010) (using "prostituted women" and
"prostitutors" in opposition to "sex workers" and "clients").
[Vol. 98:19891998
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to whatever extent I can. Throughout, therefore, I use both "prostitution"
and "sex work." I largely use male pronouns to refer to sex purchasers and
female pronouns to refer to sex sellers with the understanding that people
of any gender can and do participate in either side of the transaction, but
that most buyers are male and most sellers female. I also regularly employ
the simple terminology of "buyers" and "sellers" in an attempt to strip away
some of the either pejorative or celebratory language commonly used in
such discussion. Although some may criticize this approach, it seems the best
available.
Second, by "prostitution" I mean the sale and purchase of sex by parties
at least nominally free to consent to such exchange. This definition, again,
will be controversial for some4o and not others.41 My goal is to exclude child
prostitution, sexual slavery, trafficked prostitutes, and other forms of overtly
violent coercion. Prostitution 3.0 aims to reduce trafficking, as explained
further in Part III, but coercive markets are not this Article's primary
concern.
I. THE FOUR PROBLEMS OF PROSTITUTION 1.0
I will employ four standards to determine whether prostitution markets
deserve prohibition or legalization, three internal to economics and one
based more in political philosophy.42 We should judge whether a market is
noxious43 or sound44 by investigating the following:
(1) Information Asymmetries: Whether market failures-such as
information asymmetries-lead one to doubt that transactions in
that market are efficient for its participants;
39. Most but not all prostitutes are female, and most clients male. Uniformly adopting
female and male pronouns, respectively, however, ignores male-male and male-female
prostitution markets.
40. See Barbara Sullivan, Prostitution and Consent: Beyond the Liberal Dichotomy of 'Free or
Forced,' in MAKING SENSE OF SEXUAL CONSENT 127, 127 (Mark Cowling & Paul Reynolds eds.,
2004) ("Most of the current literature on prostitution and consent tends to-wholly or
largely-reject the possibility of consent to prostitution sex (for sex workers).").
41. Many prominent prostitution scholars have similarly separated coercive from
consensual forms of prostitution. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, "Whether from Reason or
Prejudice": Taking Money for Bodily Services, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 693, 701 (1998) ("Note that
nowhere... am I addressing the issue of child prostitution or nonconsensual prostitution (for
example, young women sold into prostitution by their parents, forcible drugging and
abduction, and so forth).").
42. This approach draws on and has similarities to that of Debra Satz. See SATZ, supra note
1, at 9 (setting out four criteria or parameters for noxious markets: bad outcomes for
participants, bad outcomes for society, weak agency, and underlying extreme vulnerabilities of
participants). These four criteria also draw on the work of Michael Trebilcock. See generally
TREBILCOCK, supra note 26 (including chapters on externalities, asymmetric information,
coercion, and commodification).
43. I borrow this term from SATZ, supra note 1, at 9.
44. I borrow this term from Ericsson, supra note 21, at 362, 365-66.
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(2) Negative Externalities: Whether negative externalities lead one
to suspect that even if transactions in that market create value for
its participants, the market is not welfare maximizing for society as
a whole;
(3) Coercion: Whether the initial conditions of the market are
marred by gross inequalities that undermine the legitimacy of
transactions in that market, such that even if transactions create
value for its participants and do not create serious externalities, we
doubt the fairness of participation in that market; and
(4) Objectionable Commodification: Whether the existence of the
market creates serious commodification of the good(s) traded in
ways we deem socially harmful, such that even if such transactions
create value, do not create externalities, and are fair, we fear that
the market harms its participants or society generally.
These criteria are relatively uncontroversial. The first three are the basic
efficiency and welfare justifications for legal intervention in a market.45
Economics justifies restricting freedom of contract only if its underlying
assumptions fail: when information asymmetries create market failures,
when externalities make a given transaction unacceptable, or when we doubt
the parties' capacity to contract.46 These first three criteria track these
economic concepts. The fourth criterion certainly relates to economics,47
but derives more from political philosophy.48 It asks whether the existence of
a given market will damage the good to be traded or social norms and
practices related to that good.
These criteria provide the four central arguments against traditional
forms of prostitution: (1) that information asymmetries between prostitutes
and customers lead to market failures; (2) that the market for sex creates
negative externalities for the rest of society (e.g., disease and crime); (3)
that dire economic conditions taint prostitutes' consent to trading sexual
services, making such consent meaningless; and (4) that a market in sex
45. See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAw & ECONOMICS 231 (5 th ed. 2008)
(discussing these three reasons and summarizing that "
[ t
ihe farther the facts depart from the
ideal of perfect rationality and zero transaction costs, the stronger the case for judges'
regulating the terms of the contract by law" (emphasis omitted)).
46. See id.
47. See SANDEL, supra note 2 1, at 110-13 (discussing the history of commodification or
commercialization arguments in modern economics).
48. I do not wish to argue at length over whether the fourth criterion could be re-
characterized as internal to economic argument. Some have characterized commodification,
for example, as an externality. See F.H. Buckley, Introduction to THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT 1, 13 (F.H. Buckley ed., 1999) ("The concern for external costs.., also explains
the 'commodification' barriers ... ,where rules of inalienability are imposed to take certain
goods out of the stream of commerce because of the social costs their sale would impose.").
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commodifies sexual relations and our views of women generally in
undesirable ways. This Part considers each in turn.
A. INFORMATIONASYMMETRIES
Information asymmetries plague traditional prostitution markets.49 A
prostitute knows a great deal of private information unavailable to a
potential client: the quality of her services, her STD status, criminal and
drug history, age and legal status, and whether she has been coerced into
selling sex by violence or dire economic conditions. A buyer also knows a
great deal of private information: whether he will treat a prostitute well,
whether he has any STDs, his criminal and drug history, and the likelihood
that he will pay without hassle.
As in any market, such information asymmetries create both adverse
selectionso and moral hazard problems.5 The adverse selection problem is
simple: it is difficult for clients to sort "bad" prostitutes-whether offering
low-quality services, carrying disease, or prone to crime-from "good." Put
differently, a street prostitute has little means to differentiate herself from
others in terms of quality of services provided, health status, or other
relevant characteristics, and customers have few means to learn a prostitute's
reputation from other past clients. As a result, market information is very
thin.52 This can lead to Akerlofs famous "lemons problem":53 high-quality
49. See Peter G. Moffatt, Economics of Prostitution, in ECONOMICS UNCUT: A COMPLETE
GUIDE TO LIFE, DEATH AND MISADVENTURE 193, 210 (Simon W. Bowmaker ed., 2005) ("The
industry is... prone to the problems caused by informational asymmetries ...."); Rocio Albert
et al., Regulating Prostitution: A Comparative Law and Economics Approach 4 (Fundaci6n de Estadios
de Economfa Aplicada, Working Paper No. 2007-30, 2007), available at
www.fedea.es/pub/Papers/2007/dt2oo7-30.pdf ("Asymmetric information between sellers and
buyers of sex is one of the main characteristics of the prostitution market.").
5o . Adverse selection problems occur prior to a transaction when information
asymmetries permit a party who is likely to produce an adverse outcome to nevertheless transact
as if that party were not of the adverse type. See KENNETHJ. ARROW, Lecture Presented to the
Federation of Swedish Industries, Stockholm, 1973, Information and Economic Behavior, in 4
COLLECTED PAPERS OF KENNETH J. ARROw: THE ECONOMICS OF INFORMATION 136, 147-48
(1984) (providing an overview of adverse selection).
51. Moral hazard occurs after a transaction, when a contract shifts risk from one party to
another and information asymmetries permit the non-risk bearer to behave adversely under the
contract without detection or consequence. See id. at 148-49 (providing an overview of moral
hazard).
52. In economic terms, prostitution is an "experience good," which is difficult to evaluate
ex ante without experience with that particular person. See generally Phillip Nelson, Information
and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. POL. ECON. 311 (1970) (drawing distinctions between search,
experience, and credence goods).
53. See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970) (describing the now famous "lemons problem").
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prostitutes will likely exit the market because they cannot differentiate their
services from those offered by lower-quality competitors.54
This may seem a trivial problem if one interprets "quality" only in terms
of the actual sex services sold. In fact, however, this market failure in
traditional street prostitution has profound implications. The inability to
differentiate and charge premium prices will drive out healthier sellers,
those with more education (and higher opportunity costs), and those with
more professional investments (in advertisement, etc.). In short, traditional
prostitution offers no mechanism for higher-end prostitutes to make the
market work, and thus is likely to include only prostitutes suffering from
poor or coercive economic conditions.
Similarly, street prostitutes have little ability to sort "good" from "bad"
clients. They must quickly try to assess whether a potential client is likely to
be violent, to pay for services without hassle, or to have an STD. This
assessment takes place in a context where the prostitute distinctly lacks
bargaining leverage: standing on a street, she has little time to conduct such
screening and no way to extract information from the potential client. This
makes it very difficult for street prostitutes to secure their physical safety.
Bad clients-violent, aggressive, drug addicted, unclean, unhealthy, or even
impolite-can participate in traditional sex markets with little fear of
detection or consequence. This again deters entry by higher-quality sellers,
who may be unwilling to bear the costs imposed by such clients, and
therefore generally degrades the market, making it more violent and
unhealthy than it would be were such screening possible. "High-quality"
customers may also be deterred from participating in the market because
they will be charged the same prices as more risky or violent clients.
Moral hazard problems also plague both prostitutes and clients. Lack of
information may make each party justifiably nervous about the other's
future behavior. For example, a prostitute may worry that a potential client
will turn violent, refuse to pay, or otherwise cause trouble for the prostitute
once the customer meets the prostitute face-to-face. A customer may engage
in sex but then threaten to call attention to the prostitute's actions by
making a scene or alerting the prostitute's neighbors. Similarly, a client may
fear that a prostitute will rob or attempt to blackmail him if she learns his
identity. Such fears distort prostitution markets.
These adverse selection and moral hazard problems illustrate the
radically underinformed nature of prostitution markets. Given the
seriousness of the services being exchanged and the potential physical,
54. For a useful discussion of the lemons problem in the context of prostitution, see
Allison Schrager, Asymmetrical Information and Hooker-nomics, MORE INTELLIGENT LIFE (Mar. 13,
2009, 3:31 PM), http://moreintelligendife.com/story/prostitution-economics/.
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mental, and emotional risks involved, both parties operate in a troublesome
informational vacuum.55
B. NEGAT1vEEXTERNALIT1ES
Externalitiess56 provide a second economic criterion for evaluating a
market.57 Even if nothing suggests market failure as between the parties, in
this second class of cases we restrict parties' freedom of contract because
their transaction creates externalities that impose costs on others.58
Determining which externalities justify regulation is difficult.59 Nevertheless,
in the prostitution context, various externalities are well recognized.
6° Two
55. The lack of information in prostitution markets is, of course, partly caused by
prostitution's illegality: in black markets, buyers and sellers exchange less information out of
fear of prosecution. See, eg., Albert et al., supra note 49, at 4 ("[1It is easy to understand that a
policy of strict prohibition would have a negative impact on the exchanged information
between prostitutes and potential clients.").
56. See David B. Johnson, Meade, Bees, and Externalities, 1
6 J.L. & ECON. 35, 35 (1973)
("[E]xternalities reflect interdependent utility or production functions in which the utility or
costs of one economic or political entity affect the utility or costs of another economic or
political entity.").
57. See Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985)
(discussing externalities as a primary justification for restraining alienation); Benjamin E.
Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract Law, in I HANDBOOK OF LAW &
ECONOMICS 30-34 (2007) (discussing third-party externalities as an economic justification for
limiting freedom of contract); Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analysis of Law, in
HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS 1661, 1712 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds.,
2002) ("A basic rationale for . . . judicial overriding of contracts is the existence of
externalities.").
58. See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 45, at 226-27 (discussing externalities and spillovers);
TREBILCOCK, supra note 26, at 58 ("Even if both parties to a particular exchange benefit from it,
the exchange may entail the imposition of costs on non-consenting third parties.").
59. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 26, at 59 ("[T]he concept of externalities is one of the
least satisfactory concepts in welfare economics, and the concept of harm to others is one of the
least satisfactory and most indeterminate concepts in liberal political theory."); see also Steven L.
Schwarcz, Rethinking Freedom of Contract: A Bankruptcy Paradigm, 77 TEX. L. REV. 515, 557 (1999)
("The more interesting question is not whether a contract adversely affects third parties, but
whether it adversely affects third parties in a way that the law deems intolerable.").
The harm principle-generally credited to John Stuart Mill's On Liberty--is "that the
sole end for which mankind are warranted... in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community ... is to prevent harm to others." JOHN
STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., 1978) (1859). Prostitution has always
presented a difficult case under the harm principle. Mill himself straddled the fence, refusing
to determine whether prostitution created sufficient harm to justify prohibition. See id. at 98
(discussing prostitution).
6o. See Moffatt, supra note 49, at 2 21 (providing an overview of the externalities commonly
associated with prostitution); Michael J. Trebilcock, External Critiques of Laissez-Faire Contract
Values, in THE FALL AND RISE OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT, supra note 48, at 78, 87-88 (discussing
externalities caused by prostitution as a basis for restricting freedom of contract). See generally
Melissa Farley, Prostitution, Trafficking, and Cultural Amnesia: What We Must Not Know in Order To
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of the most prominent are crime and disease.6' Street prostitution may cause
other forms of crime, and because it occurs in plain view,62 it may contribute
to neighborhood blight or the decline of local property values. It may also
lead to the spread of STDs, thereby affecting society at large.63
C. COERCION
Our third criterion focuses on whether inequality drives market
participation. This criterion derives from the basic egalitarian intuition that
even an efficient market can be unfair given an unfair distribution of
resources surrounding that market. Even if trading creates value for the
transacting parties without creating externalities for others, we may doubt a
market if the initial, background conditions of one of the parties makes us
suspect that party's motivations for entering the market.64
Michael Sandel calls this the "fairness objection" to certain markets.6 5 In
the prostitution context, "[s]ome people oppose prostitution on the
grounds that it is rarely, if ever, truly voluntary. They argue that those who
sell their bodies for sex are typically coerced, whether by poverty, drug
addiction, or the threat of violence." 66 Although we may concede that some
prostitute themselves willingly, we may fear that prostitutes generally sell sex
in dangerous conditions only because bad circumstances have forced that
choice. 67
Keep the Business of Sexual Exploitation Running Smoothly, 18 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 109 (2OO6)
(exploring externalities of prostitution).
61. See generally Farley, supra note 6o (cataloging harms).
62. SeeJIM LEITZEL, REGULATING VICE: MISGUIDED PROHIBITIONS AND REALISTIC CONTROLS
196-97 (2oo8) ("[T]he greater public concern is not so much with commercial sex but rather
with certain unseemly public manifestations of commercial sex.").
63. See Debra Satz, Markets in Women's Sexual Labor, io6 ETHICS 63, 68 (1995)
("Prostitution... has costs to third parties: a man who frequents a prostitute dissipates financial
resources which might otherwise be directed to his family; in a society which values intimate
marriage, infidelity costs a man's wife or companion in terms of mistrust and suffering... ; and
prostitutes often have diseases which can be spread to others."). Some contest that prostitutes
are a primary force in spreading disease. See Law, supra note 36, at 546 ("The facts do not
support the assumption that commercial sex workers are primary transmitters of venereal
disease, including HIV."). All agree, however, that at the very least prostitutes themselves risk
infection. See id. at 551 ("[Prostitutes] confront a far greater risk of contracting HIV from their
male customers than the customers face of contracting the virus from them.").
64. See, e.g., SATZ, supra note 1, at 139 ("The economic approach ignores the background
system of distribution within which prostitution occurs. Some background systems, however, are
unjust."); TREBILCOCK, supra note 26, at 78-84 (criticizing traditional law and economics for
minimizing coercion based on unequal background conditions).
65. See SANDEL, supra note 21, at i 11 ("The fairness objection points to the injustice that
can arise when people buy and sell things under conditions of inequality or dire economic
necessity.").
66. Id. at11.
67. See, e.g., Alison M. Jaggar, Prostitution, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF SEX: CONTEMPORARY
READINGS 348, 36o (Alan Soble ed., 198o) ("[I]t is the economic coercion underlying
prostitution ... that provides the basic feminist objection to prostitution.").
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Research has generally shown that street prostitutes are indeed typically
poor, relatively uneducated, transient, or otherwise vulnerable. A study by
the Sex Workers Project at the Urban Justice Center, for example, found
that many streetwalkers face violence from customers and police, "limited
job opportunities outside of sex work," "homelessness, substance
dependency, and extreme poverty and desperation at levels that are far
worse than in the general population."68 Various studies show high rates of
street prostitutes suffered sexual abuse as children.69 In addition, most law
enforcement efforts focus on street prostitutes. Thus, while street prostitutes
make up roughly twenty percent of prostitution,o "they account for ninety
percent of those arrested."71 Street prostitutes often face dire economic
circumstances: "[m] ost streetwalkers are constantly on the edge of financial
crisis."7' One study found that roughly ninety percent of prostitutes were
poor.73 These findings support concern that street prostitution is
insufficiently voluntary or consensual to justify legalization.
D. OBJECTIONABLE CoMMODIFICATION
Finally, economics generally assumes that the quality or nature of a
good is unaffected by the existence of a market in that good.74 As Debra Satz
explains, "the economic approach [to prostitution], attributes the
wrongness of prostitution [to inefficiency]."75 It is "morally indifferent" to
the sale of sex: "sexual labor is not to be treated as a commodity if and only
if such treatment fails to be efficient or welfare maximizing."76 Those
68. JUHU THUKRAL & MELISSA DITMORE, SEX WORKERS PROJECT, URBAN JUSTICE CTR.,
REVOLVING DOOR: AN ANALYSIS OF STREET-BASED PROSTITUTION IN NEW YORK CITY 10, 28
(2003).
69. See Norma Hotaling et al., The Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Women and Girls: A
Survivor Service Provider's Perspective, 18 YALEJ.L. & FEMINISM 18 1, 182 (2oo6) (finding that fifty-
seven percent of street prostitutes studied were abused as children); Donna M. Hughes et al.,
Factbook on Global Sexual Exploitation: United States of America, COAL. AGAINST TRAFFICKING WOMEN
(1999), http://www.uri.edu/artsci/wms/hughes/usa.htm (citing between seventy-five percent
and ninety-five percent of street prostitutes were abused as children).
70. See Ronald Weitzer, Prostitution: Facts and Fictions, 6 CONTEXTS, Fall 2007, at 28, 29
("An estimated 20 percent of all prostitutes work on the streets in the United States.").
71. Charles H. Whitebread, "Us" and "Them" and the Nature of Moral Regulation, 74 S. CAL.
L. REv. 361, 367 (2000).
72. D. KELLY WEISBERG, CHILDREN OF THE NIGHT: A STUDY OF ADOLESCENT PROSTITUTION
112-13 (1985).
73. See Mimi H. Silbert & Ayala M. Pines, Occupational Hazards of Street Prostitutes, 8 CRIM.
JUST. & BEHAV. 395, 396 (1981).
74. See, e.g., Margaret Jane Radin & Madhavi Sunder, The Subject and Object of
Commodification, Introduction to RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW
AND CULTURE 8, 10 (Martha M. Ertman &Joan C. Williams eds., 2005) ("[E]conomists tend to
view individual preferences as exogenous to the market and the market as merely a neutral
mechanism for maximizing satisfaction of those preferences.").




focused on objectionable commodification, however, argue that a given
market-in this case the market for sex-should be prohibited not because
of inefficiency but because it degrades social norms, values or attitudes.
According to this fourth criterion,
certain moral and civic goods are diminished or corrupted if
bought and sold. The argument from corruption (or
commodification] cannot be met by establishing fair bargaining
conditions. It applies under conditions of equality and inequality
alike.
... The... objection doesn't depend on tainted consent; it
would condemn prostitution even in a society without poverty, even
in cases of upscale prostitutes who liked the work and freely chose
it.77
The argument takes two forms: that selling sex denigrates the individual
prostitute, on the one hand, and that it commodifies our norms and ideals
about sex and women generally, on the other.78 In the last decades, various
strains of feminist scholarship have argued for both of these views.79 Other
theorists have concluded that prostitution, although clearly commodifying,
does not warrant prohibitionso Martha Nussbaum, for example, has
compared prostitution to many other forms of employment-working in a
factory, being a philosophy professor, singing in a nightclub-and argued
that although all work involves some commodification, prostitution is not
necessarily more problematic in this regard than other employment.8,'
77. SANDEL, supra note 21, at 11i-12. Margaret Jane Radin's seminal article Market-
Inalienability presents the most well-known legal discussion of the commodification concern.
Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, soo HARv. L. REV. 1849 (1987); see also Radin &
Sunder, supra note 74, at 11 ("If everything that humans value becomes conceivable only in
terms of gains from trade, human life as we now know it no longer can exist.").
78. See Kimberly D. Krawiec, A Woman's Worth, 88 N.C. L. REV. 1739, 1748 (2010)
(rejecting this position, but explaining that "at the heart of the commodification objection lies
the contention that one person's taboo transaction degrades for all the intimate items and
activities that are the subject of sale").
79. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 150-58 (1993)
(arguing that prostitution commodifies intimacy generally); CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 138-39 (1989); MARGARETJANE RADIN, CONTESTED
COMMODITIES 132-36 (1996).
8o. See, e.g., Ann Lucas, The Currency of Sex: Prostitution, Law, and Commodifcation, in
RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READINGS IN LAW AND CULTURE, supra note 74, at
248 (concluding "that laws prohibiting prostitution actually inhibit the flourishing of
prostitutes, their customers, and others"); Igor Primoratz, What's Wrong with Prostitution?, 68
PHIL. 159, 174-77 (1993) (reviewing and rejecting commodification arguments as
unconvincing); Radin, supra note 77, at 1933-36 (concluding that partial inalienability is the
best solution for prostitution markets).
81. See Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 700-07; see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX AND




Ultimately, she concludes that "there appears to be nothing baneful or
value-debasing about taking money for a service, even when that service
expresses something intimate about the self."
8 2
The market conditions under which Prostitution 1.o occurs exacerbate
commodification concerns.8S When a prostitute sells sex in an anonymous,
highly risky context such as street-walking, with essentially no protection
against violence or disease and no means to identify and avoid "bad"
customers, she is at her most vulnerable. More than that, the customer
purchasing her services is willing to participate in making her so
vulnerable-is willing, in short, to treat her as a person who deserves
nothing better. He participates in a market that is structurally noxious to
prostitutes: even if he commits no physical violence against her, he knows
that she is in a market that permits others to do so without consequence.
This inherently denigrates her personhood. Moreover, social norms that
permit such an ill-functioning market likewise suggest that society in general
holds a view of women or sex that treats prostitutes as fungible commodities
that can-and should-function in such a poor environment. This lack of
information in the market triggers the objectionable commodification
criterion.
II. THE INCOMPLETE IMPROVEMENTS OF PROSTITUTION 2.0
Prostitution 1.o suffers from four problems: information asymmetries,
negative externalities, coercion, and commodification. These problems
motivate the state's infringement on freedom of contract in this context. In
short, Prostitution i.o can be a brutal and base market that harms its
participants and society generally.
In the last decade, however, a new form of prostitution has emerged
that may somewhat remedy these shortcomings. Prostitution 2.0 is
independent, Internet-enabled, "indoor," and more middle- or upper-class
than street prostitution.8 4 Sociologists and economists of sex work have
increasingly begun to study how Prostitution 2.0 functions, and some have
argued that it deserves legalization. 55 This Part presents the first in-depth
analysis, however, of the strengths and weaknesses of Prostitution 2.0. It
82. Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 716.
83. The debate about exactly who and what is commoditized as a result of prostitution
seems particularly intractable, and I will not resolve it here. Further, I am not convinced that
commodification arguments on their own justify prostitution's prohibition. I am convinced,
however, that the market conditions of Prostitution i.o are such that commodification is a
problem which must be addressed.
84. For clarity, I define "Prostitution 2.o" as technology-enabled, independent prostitution
that involves neither solicitation nor sexual activity in public. This definition separates
Prostitution 2.o not only from street prostitution, but also from brothels, strip club prostitution,
massage parlor prostitution, or other forms of indoor prostitution that cannot be described as
independent because of the involvement of a pimp or agency.
85. See supra notes 29-3o and accompanying text.
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looks first at the three technologies driving Prostitution 2.0: low-cost online
advertising, reviews of sellers, and screening of buyers. It then takes seriously
the possibility that these technologies have sufficiently improved prostitution
to warrant legalization. It tests Prostitution 2.0 against our four criteria to
see whether it remedies the problems of traditional prostitution. This
analysis demonstrates that Prostitution 2.0 is, indeed, an advance. These
technologies provide new means for prostitutes and clients to sort and signal
each other to overcome adverse selection and moral hazard problems; they
make Prostitution 2.0 less socially visible than traditional prostitution and
reduce the spread of disease, ameliorating externalities; they make
Prostitution 2.0 less coercive; and, finally, they lessen commodification
concerns.
This is hopeful. Ultimately, however, this Part concludes by arguing that
Prostitution 2.o has not remedied Prostitution i.o's problems sufficiently to
justify legalization. In many ways, Prostitution 2.0's technologies foreshadow
the vision of Prostitution 3.0 laid out in the Introduction.8 6 They show the
promise and potential of technological reform in this context. At the same
time, they have not evolved enough to truly solve the problems in today's sex
markets. That would require more concerted legal reform and technological
innovation, as discussed in Part III.
A. PRoSTrrUTION 2.0 'S TECHNOLOGIES
Technological change has always impacted sex markets. In the 1970s
and ig8os, for example, the CB radio was considered a transformative
prostitution tool, reviled by some and celebrated by others for introducing
new means for prostitutes and their customers to find and communicate
with each other.8 7 Today, the Internet has revolutionized the sex trade, at
least in the higher echelons of the prostitution market. 88
This Subpart explores three technologies at the center of this
revolution. First, the Internet has lowered the cost of advertising, making it
possible for independent prostitutes to reach huge numbers of potential
customers without resorting to pimps or escort agencies. Second, interactive
review sites permit clients to talk about, rate, and compare prostitutes
online. Third, the Internet has created new means for prostitutes to screen
86. See supra Introduction.
87. See, e.g., Joan Luxenburg & Lloyd Klein, CB Radio Prostitution: Technology and the
Displacement of Deviance, in GENDER ISSUES, SEX OFFENSES, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 71 (Sol
Chaneles ed., 1984) (describing the use of CB radio technology to match prostitutes and truck
drivers along interstates).
88. See Keith Sharp & Sarah Earle, Cyberpunters and Cyberwhores: Prostitution on the Internet, in
DOT.CONS: CRIME, DEVIANCE AND IDENTITY ON THE INTERNET 36, 36 (Yvonne Jewkes ed., 2003)
("[T]he nature of the relationships involved in the selling of sexual services is undergoing a
significant transformation, thanks to the emergence and near exponential spread of the
Internet.").
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clients, thereby reducing the risk of violence, disease, and arrest. These
screening mechanisms include direct email communication with customers
and other prostitutes, electronic blacklists of "bad" clients, and




In any market, buyers and sellers incur search costs to find each other.9o
Advertising can reduce such costs. Through advertising, a seller can publicly
display her resources and capabilities to attract customers.9' Historically,
however, street prostitutes have had limited means to advertise.92 The most
common is to walk the "stroll[ ]" in one's geography, thus signaling
availability to potential buyers.93 Alternatively, prostitutes can pay a pimp or
madam to solicit customers.94 Such intermediaries can sometimes better
avoid law enforcement and more easily promote a prostitute, but often at
significant cost.95
The Internet has radically lowered the cost of prostitution advertising.96
A prostitute can easily create a website at low cost, and many do.97 Such
websites typically contain descriptions of the prostitute, photographs,
information about rates, a calendar of availability, and contact
89. Prostitution markets are generally structured to manage three main costs: advertising
to attract customers, reputation-building by prostitutes to support price differentiation, and
maintaining personal safety and security. See Cunningham & Kendall, supra note 20, at 224
(describing these three basic costs). These three technologies correspond to these three costs.
See id. at 226-27, 230-38, 246-52.
9o . See, e.g., George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. POL. ECON. 213, 2 16
(g6s) ("The cost of search, for a consumer, may be taken as approximately proportional to
the number of (identified) sellers approached, for the chief cost is time.").
91. See Nicholas Kaldor, The Economic Aspects of Advertising, 18 REv. ECON. STUD. 1, 1
(195o-1951).
92. This is in part due to prostitution's illegality. If prostitution is legal, sellers can take out
newspaper or other ads, so long as public solicitation is not banned. The Internet has
dramatically lowered the cost of advertising, however, such that one would see its effects
whether or not prostitution were legalized.
93. See, e.g., Cunningham & Kendall, supra note 3, at 275 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
94. See Cunningham & Kendall, supra note 20, at 224-25.
95. Id.
96. See Scott Cunningham & Todd D. Kendall, Sex for Sale: Online Commerce in the World's
Oldest Profession, in CRIME ON-LINE: CORRELATES, CAUSES, AND CONTEXT 145, 147 (Thomas J.
Holt ed., 20 11) ("The Internet has... [led] to a virtual flood of prostitution advertising ... ").
97. See Teela Sanders, Researching the Online Sex Work Community, in VIRTUAL METHODS:
ISSUES IN SOCIAL RESEARCH ON THE INTERNET 67, 68 (Christine Hine ed., 2005) ("Sex workers




information.9S Specialized web design and hosting services facilitate such
advertising by catering to the prostitution market.99
In addition to creating an independent website, a prostitute can
advertise on one of many adult-oriented advertising platforms. Some such
platforms focus exclusively on sexual services. Eros, for example, describes
itself as "All Things Erotic."oo It organizes advertisements by country, state,
and preference (e.g., female escorts, male escorts, transgendered escorts,
etc.). Eros presents each prostitute's advertisement in a standardized
template that includes information about height, weight, ethnicity, age, hair
and eye color, bust size, and availability (e.g., to men or women), as well as a
narrative description, photographs, pricing, and contact information.-o1
Other Internet sites-such as Backpage-permit adult services
advertisements while also advertising other goods and services.1o2
Low-cost online advertising "has had the effect of creating a virtual 'red
light' district, where prostitutes and their clients operate with relatively low
risk of detection."'°s It allows prostitutes to reach customers safely and
independently, and customers to search for prostitutes without leaving
home. A recent study found, for example, that ninety-three percent of
technology-facilitated sex workers are "independents"-operating without a
pimp or escort agency-whereas between forty and eighty percent of
streetwalking prostitutes "work under pimp management." o4 In addition, by
matching prostitutes and clients off the streets and in a less rushed
environment than Prostitution i.o, online advertising permits the next two
technologies of Prostitution 2.o: reviews of sellers and screening of buyers.
98. For a detailed overview of online prostitution advertising practices, see Tammy Castle
&Jenifer Lee, Ordering Sex in Cyberspace: A Content Analysis of Escort Websites, 11 INT'LJ. CULTURAL
STUD. 107, 110-11 (2008) (studying seventy-six escort websites and analyzing the types of
information provided); Jenifer A. Lee-Gonyea et al., Laid To Order: Male Escorts Advertising on the
Internet, 30 DEvIANT BEHAV. 321, 323 (2009) (conducting similar research on male escort
advertisements); Brigid Tara Agresti, E-Prostitution: A Content Analysis of Internet Escort




99. See, e.g., CUTIEsTOOLs, http://www.cuties-tools.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013)
(providing low-cost premium website design for prostitutes, including mobile phone versions,
client screening applications, video hosting, and data analytics); EscORTSITE,
http://www.escortsite.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) (providing free escort website creation as
well as premium content management).
oo. EROS, http://www.eros.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
lot. See id.
102. See, e.g., BAcKPAGE.COM, supra note 14.
103. Cunningham & Kendall, supra note 96, at 147.
104. See Cunningham & Kendall, supra note 3, at 284.
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2. Review of Sellers
In addition to advertising, the Internet has created new mechanisms for
clients to review and discuss prostitutes online.105 For example, The Erotic
Review is an interactive peer-to-peer feedback site that hosts tens of
thousands of client reviews of prostitutes each year..o6 The site structures
reviews using a variety of categories, including some related to appearance
(e.g., age, height, ethnicity, hair color, physical build, breast size, etc.),
services offered (e.g., massage, sex, kissing, and various sex acts), cost, and
general information (e.g., prostitute's phone number, website, email, and
agency affiliation, if any).1°7 In addition, the site permits a reviewer to
include an unstructured narrative describing the client's experience with a
prostitute. Most of the information on The Erotic Review is available without
charge, with the exception that only paying customers (or customers that
have themselves submitted two reviews in the prior month) can access this
detailed narrative. Other sites, such as PunterNet,os BigDoggie.net,109 and
Naughty Reviews,llo provide similar services. Specialized review sites also
exist for male escorts.' 
1
Without including any overly graphic details, a few examples may help
clarify how such review sites change prostitution markets. A recent review of
a New York escort named "Kylie" included the following information.I12 She
is an Asian woman, age twenty-six to thirty, roughly five feet, two inches tall,
with straight brown hair below the shoulders. Her breasts are size 34-35 DD
due to breast implants. She has a few tattoos. The Erotic Review lists 228
reviews of Kylie's services. A quick read of just the public portions of those
reviews reveals the following comments about Kylie's services: "Didn't realize
105. See Luis E.C. Rocha et al., Information Dynamics Shape the Sexual Networks of Internet-
Mediated Prostitution, 107 PROc. NAT'L ACAD. Sci. 57o6, 57o6 (2010) ("Over the past decade,
the Internet has become an increasingly important vehicle for sharing information about
prostitution."). This use of the Internet arose early. In the ig8os, the Usenet groups
alt.sex.service and alt.sex.prostitution included discussions between sex buyers of the services
offered by sex workers. See Petter Holme, Social, Sexual and Economic Networks of Prostitution, 45
LEONARDO 8o, 8o (2012) (discussing early Usenet examples).
io6. See THE EROTIC REVIEW, supra note 15.
107. See id.
i o8. See PUNTERNET, supra note 16.
log. SeeBIGDOGGIE.NET, http://www.bigdoggie.net (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
110. See NAUGHTY REVIEwS, http://www.naughtyreviews.com (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
111. See Trevon Logan & Manisha Shah, Face Value: Information and Signaling in an Illegal
Market 7-8 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14841, 2009) (arguing that
review sites are particularly important in the male escort context because male prostitutes more
often act violently towards clients than female prostitutes); BoYroY, http://www.boytoy.com
(last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
112. Kylie's Profile, THE EROTIC REVIEW, http://www.theeroticreview.com/reviews/show.
asp?id=1 5 5 9o 9 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
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Kylie's English is so poor .... Overall a good time, but would not repeat.";"3
"Same as the photos, she's the cutest brunette I've seen in ages. She has...
the sweetest manners. Kylie well deserves her reputation.""4 Those willing to
pay for The Erotic Review's premium service can read more explicit details
about her physical appearance and the experiences of her clients, as well as
access client ratings of Kylie on a ten-point rating system.
Similarly, the twenty-eight available reviews of another New York escort
named "Lindsey" reveal that she is a Caucasian woman with red hair,
roughly five feet, five inches tall.,5 Her reviewers comment repeatedly that
the photos she provides are not genuine."16 Some also note that Lindsey
shares her apartment, where they met, with a roommate, which requires
spending time together in a relatively cramped bedroom"7 that some
complain is untidy." 8 Several note that Lindsey is somewhat overweight, and
various reviewers comment that although she is enthusiastic, she might not
be worth her fees.,,9 Others disagreed, arguing that Lindsey offers a
reasonable price for her appearance and services."o
Such review sites allow buyers to communicate in ways previously
unimaginable. Such sharing of client feedback creates vast new pools of
information previously unavailable to sex buyers in advance of meeting a
prostitute. In addition, review sites also provide a medium for buyers and
sellers to communicate outside of in-person, paid sessions. Sometimes
113. KHMJANoi's Review of Kylie, THE EROTIC REVIEW, http://www.theeroticreview.com/
reviews/showReview.asp?Review=l 272848 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
114. 5 75 XD's Review of Kylie, THE EROTIC REVIEW, http://www.theeroticreview.com/
reviews/showReview.asp?Review--126786 5 (last visited Mar. 23, 2013).
115. Lindsey's Profile, THE EROTIC REVIEW, http://www.theeroticreview.com/reviews/
show.asp?id=s73635 (last visited Feb. 1 1, 2013).
116. See, e.g., BOWLER3 oo's Review of Lindsey, THE EROTIC REVIEW, http://www.
theeroticreview.com/reviews/showReview.asp?Review=s 262342 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013)
("She looks absolutely nothing like the girl in the picture. She is very plain looking but
extremely heavy."); KMKM3 2v's Review of Lindsey, THE EROTIC REVIEW, http://www.
theeroticreview.com/reviews/showReview.asp?Review=12o2624 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013)
("She's not the same girl pictured in the ad. Had I known, I would've cancelled."); SLAPPY's
Review of Lindsey, THE EROTIC REVIEW http://www.theeroticreview.com/reviews/showReview.
asp?Review-12 5 5 14 6 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) ("It has long been established that the photos
in her ads are not her ... ").
117. See UNCLEBUD's Review of Lindsey, THE EROTIC REVIEW, http://www.theeroticreview.
com/reviews/showReview.asp?Review=I 254416 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
118. See JRKEELE Y68"s Review of Lindsey, THE EROTIC REVIEW, http://www.theeroticreview.
com/reviews/showReview.asp?Review-- 201 1 6o (last visited Feb. 1 1, 2013).
119. See TRA VEJJNGMAN4 oo's Review of Lindsey, THE EROTIC REVIEW, http://www.theerotic
review.com/reviews/showReview.asp?Review=t 164472 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
120. See CH8RLIE's Review of Lindsey, THE EROTIC REVIEW http://www.theeroticreview.
com/reviews/showReview.asp?Review=z 217113 (last visited Feb. 11, 2013) ("[S]he's the best
value courtesan in NYC.").
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prostitutes contest reviews or call out customers' bad behavior.121 The Erotic
Review also hosts discussion boards on which both escorts and clients can
opine about various aspects of the industry, or through which clients can
discuss a given provider in detail.'
2
Such sites are by no means value neutral. Some have argued that they
inherently degrade and objectify women,' 2 3 and that the possibility of online
reviews creates an added stressor for prostitutes.'2 4 Research suggests that
reviews do, in fact, affect a prostitute's future chances for increased business,
as well as the market price for future services.'25 In other words, these review
sites provide a means for prostitutes to differentiate themselves in the
market.126
3. Screening of Buyers
Finally, the Internet has created new means for prostitutes to screen
clients in advance of a face-to-face meeting. As we saw in Part I, street
prostitutes have few ways to sort "good" from "bad" clients.127 The Internet
alleviates this market failure by creating three ways for prostitutes to screen
buyers: email communication with the client or other prostitutes, online
blacklists, and intermediated identity verification services. Consider each in
turn.
Email. First, Internet-enabled prostitutes can demand information from
potential clients by email. If a client responds to an online advertisement,
for example, the prostitute can require information from the client before
arranging a meeting. Such screening is now commonplace. Prostitutes
demand name, place of work, telephone number, and other information.,2
8
Such information allows a prostitute to research a potential client online in
order to verify his identity. In addition, a prostitute can use information
gleaned from such online searching to assess the client's education level,
121. Audacia Ray, Sex on the Open Market: Sex Workers Harness the Power of the Internet, in
C'LICK ME: A NETPORN STUDIES READER 45, 54-55 (KatrienJacobs et al. eds., 2007), available at
http://www.networkcultures.org/-uploads/24.pdf (describing this two-way communication on
review sites).
122. See Discussion Boards, THE EROTIC REVIEW, http://www.theeroticreview.com/
discussion-boards/index.asp (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
123. See, e.g., Mental and Emotional Torment, Repackaged as a 'Review,' THE PROSTITUTION
EXPERIENCE (May 1o, 2012), http://theprostitutionexperience.com/?p=79.
124. See Kim Davies & Lorraine Evans, A Virtual View of Managing Violence Among British
Escorts, 28 DEVIANT BEHAv. 525, 542-47 (2007) (arguing that reviews create new stress for
female escorts).
125. See Cunningham & Kendall, supra note 2o, at 233 ("Based on our interviews with sex
workers, we believe [online] reviews are highly important in establishing reputation, and
workers exert substantial effort to maintain positive reviews ...
126. See infta Part II.B.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 49-55.
12 8. Murphy & Venkatesh, supra note 22, at 140 (describing screening); see Ray, supra note
12 1, at 57-58 (describing screening in detail).
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whether he is gainfully employed, and other indicators of personality or
temperament. Email communication also allows a prostitute to evaluate the
client's politeness, timeliness, and responsiveness, all of which may signal the
client's likely willingness to be respectful or pay timely for services. Such
research can be reassuring. As Ray puts it:
For the most part, this kind of search isn't going to yield any kind
of "this man is mean to hookers" explicit warning, but it may
deliver vacation photos, a flan-recipe blog, or boring PowerPoint
presentations about a company's gains and losses-all of which
contribute to a better sense of who the man is in the real world.129
Prostitutes can be quite sophisticated about using technology to screen
clients in this way. One escort site, for example, hosts a detailed "how to" on
ways to verify a client's identity.'s ° It includes advice on checking the meta-
tags in a photograph sent by a potential client to verify the location at which
the photograph was taken, on how to verify an email account's creation date
to sort out potential clients with recently created accounts (which may
indicate police activity or other trouble), and on tracking a client's Internet
Protocol ("IP") address or cell phone to determine general location.131
Email communication in advance of a physical meeting also allows
prostitutes to communicate with each other about clients. Internet-enabled
prostitutes often request that a client provide references from other
prostitutes.'13 These reference checks allow prostitutes to exchange
information about a client's identity and civility. They serve as a powerful
independent check on the client and can greatly reassure prostitutes.
Online Blacklists. Second, the Internet facilitates information sharing
between prostitutes at scale. Sex workers also shared information about
buyers in the pre-Internet economy: "dirty trick lists" were passed around in
some cities, listing "bad Johns," their phone numbers, and details of their
physical appearance.33 The Internet has made such sharing far more
effective at low cost, however. Prostitutes run blacklists online to share
information about safety, hygiene, payment problems, drug use, and other
issues with customers.' 34
129. Ray, supranote 121, at 58.




132. See Cunningham & Kendall, supra note 2o, at 226-27 (discussing these screening
mechanisms); Cunningham & Kendall, supra note 96 at 151 ("[Fifty-nine percent] of sex
workers who operate online regularly demand references.").
133. For an example of a dirty trick list, see BERNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 95 (providing a
copy of a San Francisco "Ugly Mugs: Men To Watch Out For" flyer).
134. See Ray, supra note 121, at 61 ("The freedom to post information about bad clients
allows sex workers to alert each other to clients to avoid.... .").
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The National Blacklist, for example, describes itself as a "deadbeat
registry."'35 It provides a platform for prostitutes to exchange information
about "customers who make threats, use violence, are scammers, ripoffs,
time wasters, abusers, or those who withhold money."'s 6 The site offers
"Automatic Alerts" via email or text message to prostitutes if new postings
appear about an incident or police activity in their geographic area. The site
is very active, hosting over fifty-seven thousand blacklist entries for various
American states and Canadian provinces.,37 An informal review of the site
suggests that many of the blacklist entries are for customers who wasted an
escort's time or were "no shows." Others include customers who failed to pay
or haggled over fees, threatened to call the police, tried to videotape a
prostitute without her consent, behaved strangely, had visible signs of a
sexually transmitted disease, or were dangerous.-s5 Other smaller or regional
sites provide similar means for prostitutes to blacklist customers.'39
Identity Verification Services. The Internet provides a third means for
prostitutes to screen potential customers: intermediated identity verification
services. These services collect information from clients and then verify that
information independently. When a client contacts a prostitute, he refers
the prostitute to the verification service using a unique identification
number. The verification service then reassures the prostitute that the
client's name and place of work has been verified, but does not give her his
real name or information.
Date-Check, for example, advertises itself as an "adult entertainment
verification" website.4o The service verifies to prostitutes that its clients meet
Date-Check's criteria:
The client is required to submit a heap of personal information,
including his full name and credit card information, as well as a
home and work address, the name of the company he works for,
and his position and title. This information is not passed directly
on to the provider, but it must be given for membership so that a
provider can rest assured that the client checked out when the
website's staff followed up on his points of contact.'4'




139. See, e.g., VERIFYHIM.COM, http://www.verifyhim.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
"Counter blacklist" services exist also that offer to remove negative information about a client
from blacklists or search results. See HOBBYIST DEFENDER, http://hobbyistdefender.wix.com/
hobbyistdefender (last visited Mar. 2, 2013) (offering to assist with removing slanderous
blacklist entries).
140. See DATE-CHECK, supra note 17.
141. Ray, supranote 121,at61.
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The service is free for sex workers and costs roughly seventy dollars per year
for clients.,42 Other sites provide similar intermediated verification services.'43
As we will discuss, such intermediated verification services foreshadow
the more complex and intensive verification that I argue should be required
as part of Prostitution 3.0.'44 These early Prostitution 2.0 services do not
verify STD status or criminal history, nor do they simultaneously verify
information about prostitutes as opposed to clients. Nevertheless, they are
an interesting first step in the direction of Prostitution 3.o.
These three means of client screening-direct email contact, blacklist
registries, and intermediated identity verification services-give a prostitute
access to new information about her client in advance of an in-person
meeting. This is a radical change from street prostitution, in which no such
investigation is possible, and even from other forms of indoor prostitution
such as brothels, where clients remain more or less anonymous.
B. THE IMPROVEMENTS OFPROSTITUTION 2.0
These Internet technologies-low-cost advertising, reviews of sellers,
and screening of buyers-have created Prostitution 2.o. Let us now use our
four criteria to assess the impact of these technologies. Doing so illustrates
that Prostitution 2.0 is indeed an upgrade as compared to traditional street
prostitution. Part II.C will then explore the limits of Prostitution 2.0's
improvements.
i. Effects on Information Asymmetries
Figure 1: Prostitution 2.o's Effects on Information Asymmetries
Signaling Sorting
A Prostitute Can Learn The Buyer Can Signal His The Prostitute Can Sort
More About a Buyer Quality Through Information About the
Because: * Email Buyer Such as:
" Verification Sites * Employment
" Investigating information
online reputation * Other online
* Revealing personal information
information * Blacklists
* References
A Buyer Can Learn The Prostitute Can Signal The Buyer Can Sort
More About a Her Quality Through Information About the
Prostitute Because: * Email Prostitute Such as:
* Advertisement * Review sites
* Blogs * Advertisements
• Videos
142. See Frequently Asked Questions, DATE-CHECK, http://www.date-check.com/faq.asp#9 (last
visited Feb. 11, 2013).
143. See, e.g., RoOMSERVICE2000, supra note 18.
144. See infra Part III.A (discussing verification in Prostitution 3.0).
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In economic terms, Prostitution 2.0 has lowered the costs of both
sorting and signaling-the two means by which parties learn about their
contracting partners in order to overcome adverse selection problems.'45
"Sorting" refers to the ways in which an uninformed party can seek out
public information to verify a counterparty's type.,46 "Signaling," by contrast,
refers to the ways in which an informed party can credibly indicate its type to
its uninformed counterpart.47 To the extent that technological changes
improve the ability of buyers and sellers to sort and signal-or reduce the
costs of sorting and signaling-a market will become more efficient as
information asymmetries diminish.
Figure i shows the four ways in which Prostitution 2.0 allows new, lower-
cost sorting and signaling: (1) prostitutes can now signal more efficiently to
clients; (2) buyers can signal to prostitutes; (3) prostitutes can sort clients;
and (4) clients can sort prostitutes. 148 This changes sex markets significantly.
Consider each change in turn.
First, prostitutes have new ways to signal quality to clients. Ubiquitous
Internet advertising lowers the cost of prostitutes and clients finding each
other and affords prostitutes the opportunity to signal their educational
background or sophistication to clients.'49 To the extent that a prostitute
spends a greater amount of time and money on her advertisements, this can
signal her quality to potential customers.,50 The escort advertising site Eros
provides a good example. Eros' charges for advertisements vary based on the
145. See generally John G. Riley, Silver Signals: Twenty-Five Years of Screening and Signaling, 39J.
ECON. LITERATURE 432 (2001) (providing an overview of sorting and signaling); Michael
Spence, Informational Aspects of Market Structure: An Introduction, go QJ. ECON. 591, 592 (1976)
("[Signaling and sorting] are opposite sides of the same coin.").
146. Sorting or "screening" theory assumes that an uninformed party will filter
counterparties based on what observable characteristics or information are available, if the
desired characteristic is unobservable. See, e.g., Roger Klein et al., Factors Affecting the Output and
Quit Propensities of Production Workers, 58 REV. ECON. STUD. 929, 938 (iggi) (exploring the
example of employers sorting job applicants based on high school graduation as a proxy for
perseverance).
147. Signaling "refers to actions taken by an informed party for the sole purpose of credibly
revealing his private information." N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 487 (lack
W. Calhoun et al. eds., 5 th ed. 2009). Put differently, "[information asymmetries] may give rise
to signaling, which is the attempt by the informed side of the market to communicate
information that the other side would find valuable." WILLIAM A. MCEACHERN, ECONOMICS 619
(5 th ed. 2000).
148. See, e.g., Cunningham & Kendall, supra note 96, at 152 ("Online institutions increase
the availability of information, and may ameliorate some . . . harms for both client and
provider.").
149. See supra text accompanying notes 89-102.
150. See Matthew V. Pruitt & Amy C. Krull, Escort Advertisements and Male Patronage of
Prostitutes, 32 DEVIANT BEHAV. 38, 55-57 (2010) (reporting results of study of escort
advertisements and finding evidence that escorts use advertisements to project personality traits
in addition to physical traits or services offered).
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advertisement's features.1'5 Like any business that spends money on
advertising, this additional cost is a way for a prostitute to signal credibly that
she is of higher quality than her peers.'5
2
Perhaps more credible still, if a prostitute invests in her website's copy
editing, professional photographs, or video, this may signal to potential
customers her quality, education level, or income (and thus popularity or
success in the market). Some prostitutes also blog.53 Such blogs may serve as
a signaling device, showing the sex worker's education, conversational
ability, and willingness to dedicate time to self-publication and writing. Such
signals matter: Evidence suggests, for example, that sex workers proficient in
English can charge higher prices and are more likely to attract customers,'54
and that prostitutes willing to reveal an accurate picture of themselves
command higher prices.'55
Second, sex buyers can also signal their quality to prostitutes. For
example, a sex buyer's willingness to divulge information to Date-Check'56
serves as a credible signal that the buyer believes that he has nothing to
hide. Similarly, if a buyer becomes a member of The Erotic Review and
accumulates online references from prostitutes with whom that buyer has
transacted,'s7 this too signals to prostitutes that the client has invested in his
reputation and is therefore likely to be relatively reputable. In addition, by
sharing background information such as employment status, a client gives a
prostitute access to powerful signals of less visible but important
characteristics such as his sense of responsibility or general pro-social nature.
Even a willingness to divulge information to the prostitute by email may
itself be a signal that the client is forthright and cooperative.
151. See Advertisement Pricing, EROS ADS, http://www.erosads.com/content/pricing (last
visited Feb. 11, 2013). Cost also may vary based on location. Id.
152. Economists focus on signals that are difficult to fake and thus self-verifying. See, e.g.,
DIANE COYLE, THE SOULFUL SCIENCE: WHAT ECONOMISTS REALLY Do AND WHY IT MATTERS 163
(rev. ed. 201O) (stating that Indian villagers borrow huge sums to pay for expensive weddings
"to signal their caste and social status"); Paul Herbig & John Milewicz, Market Signaling Behavior
in the Service Industry, 1 ACAD. MARKETING STUD.J. 35, 39 (1997) (noting that professinals in the
service industry will spend vast sums on elaborate office buildings to signal their quality and
solvency to potential clients). Spence began modem signaling theory with Michael Spence, job
Market Signaling, 87 QJ. ECON. 355 (1973); see also Michael Spence, Competition in Salaries,
Credentials, and Signaling Prerequisites for Jobs, 90 Q.J. ECON. 51 (1976) (discussing his classic
example of signaling through educational achievement).
153. See, e.g., AFTER HOURS, www.texasgoldengirl.com/afterhours (last visited Mar. 5,
2013); THE LAS VEGAS COURTESAN, www.thelasvegascourtesan.com (last visited Mar. 5, 2013).
154. See Vicky Bungay et al., Structure and Agency: Reflections from an Exploratory Study of
Vancouver Indoor Sex Workers, 13 CULTURE, HEALTH & SEXUALITY 15, 20 (201 1) ("English
proficiency affect[s sex workers' outcomes] by influencing clients' decision making.").
155. Male escorts willing to post a face picture as a signal of both quality and
commitment-because it is more difficult for a revealed escort to deceive a client and get away
with it-command a price premium in the market. See Logan & Shah, supra note 111, at 2.
156. See supra note 140 and accompanying text (explaining Date-Check).
157. See supra notes 15, 1o6-07, 112-22 (explaining The Erotic Review).
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Third, sex buyers can sort prostitutes, primarily by accessing
prostitution review sites. These review services begin to solve the lemons
problem inherent in street prostitution.5 8 Review sites improve a client's
ability to sort prostitutes, and thus a prostitute's ability to differentiate
herself. If she invests in her reputation and her clients rate her highly, she
will be more able to attract clients and charge premium prices. Although
somewhat mercenary, competition favors high-end sellers. Indeed, it allows
the introduction of such sellers into the market, whereas traditionally the
market could not support such prostitution:
As more and more information on providers becomes available
through this new medium . . . the informational asymmetries
are.., expected to diminish substantially. In consequence, high-
quality providers are likely to see their businesses flourish, while
low-quality providers are likely to be driven out of the market
early.159
For example, review sites reduce the possibility of and rewards for deception
in prostitution markets.
[B]y informing other clients of deceptive sex workers and by
reviewing sex workers on independent, client-owned websites[,
t]he informal policing in the market raises the cost of
misrepresentation for would-be fraudulent escorts and rewards the
truthful self-disclosure of honest escorts .... ,6o
This disclosure should increase the welfare of both prostitutes and clients.,6,
Fourth and finally, prostitutes can sort clients. Google and other search
engines now give a prostitute free access to huge amounts of publicly
available information about a potential client. So long as the client reveals
his real name and identifying information, a prostitute can often use the
Internet to piece together a relatively rich picture of that client's
background and education level. She can then try to extrapolate from that
information the characteristics that matter most to her, such as propensity to
violence, health status, or character.
In addition to sorting and signaling, Prostitution 2.0 creates another
means to reduce the impact of information asymmetries: hostage-taking.
158. See supra Part I.A.
159. Moffatt, supra note 49, at 210.
s6o. Logan & Shah, supra note 11, at 1-2 (studying online information exchanges about
male escorts).
161. SeeJeffrey R. Young, Commodification of Sexual Labor: The Contribution of Internet
Communities to Prostitution Reform (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Florida Atlantic
University) (on file with author) (arguing that Internet reviews can contribute to social order
and trust, and, to some extent, neutralize concerns about prostitution).
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Hostage-taking is a means to reduce moral hazard. 62 One party takes
something of value to the other-such as a financial bond-to deter future
bad behavior.
For example, if a client reveals his identity to a prostitute in advance of
a face-to-face meeting, the client knows that the prostitute can now hold that
identity hostage. As one escort noted:
When a new client contacted her online, she wouldn't book an
appointment until she had secured his real name and his work
telephone number. Then she'd call him the morning of their date,
ostensibly just to say how excited she was to meet him.
But the call also acknowledged that she could reach him at will
and, if something were to go wrong, she could storm his office.
"Nobody wants to see the 'crazy ho' routine," she says with a
smile.,63
The Internet thus changes the leverage between prostitutes and clients,
giving the prostitute power to deter a client from bad behavior. By
permitting prostitutes to take information hostage in this way, Prostitution
2.0 somewhat levels the playing field between prostitutes and clients.' 64
Empirical study of Prostitution 2.0 seems to confirm that information
technology has reduced information asymmetries between prostitutes and
clients. In particular, various studies suggest that indoor, Internet-enabled
prostitution is physically safer than street prostitution.' 65 Sudhir Venkatesh's
study of 290 women in New York over twelve months, for example, found
that independent escorts earn about fifty percent more than street
prostitutes and experience about half of the violence. 66 Tamara
O'Doherty's review of various studies found that sixty-three percent of
independent, Prostitution 2.0 escorts "had not experienced any
victimization while working in the sex industry," and that most victimization
that did occur was at the hands of "coworkers or clients [who] refus[ed] to
162. See generally OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE (1996)
(discussing the use of hostages to suppress moral hazard).
163. STEVEN D. LEVITT & STEPHEN J. DUBNER, SUPERFREAKONOMICS: GLOBAL COOLING,
PATRIOTIC PROSTITUTES, AND WHY SUICIDE BOMBERS SHOULD Buy LIFE INSURANCE 51 (2009).
164. For some of the limitations of this improvement, see supra Part I.C.
165. See Ronald Weitzer, Moral Crusade Against Prostitution, SOC'Y, Mar.-Apr. 2006, at 33, 35
("[T]he research literature does indicate that violence is more of an occupational hazard for
street prostitutes than for indoor workers.").
166. See Sudhir Venkatesh, How Tech Tools Transformed New York's Sex Trade, WIRED (Jan. 31,
2011, 12:00 PM), http://www.wired.com/magazine/2o1 /oi/ffsextrade/all/.
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use condoms or pay for services."',67 One study has found that street
prostitutes are "three times more likely.., to experience an assault and
eleven times more likely to have been raped."' 68 Other studies report similar
findings.169 As Weitzer has put it, "there is no doubt that indoor settings are
generally safer than the streets.'7 This suggests that Prostitution 2.0'S
reduced information asymmetries allow prostitutes to avoid violent clients
and stay safer than street prostitutes.'7'
2. Effects on Negative Externalities
Prostitution 2.o also ameliorates negative externalities to some extent,
again by reducing the cost of sorting and signaling. Consider first the
externalities of social blight or crime. Unlike street prostitution, Internet-
enabled prostitution "may have no appreciable impact on the surrounding
neighborhood, and, if it is discreet, there is normally little public awareness
of it."172 Because Prostitution 2.0 moves the search for prostitutes online and
out of sight, such markets become much less visible to the public.,73 There is
167. See Tamara O'Doherty, Victimization in Off-Street Sex Industry Work, 17 VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN 944, 955-56 (201 1).
168. See Weitzer, supra note 165, at 35.
169. See Andrea Kraisi et al., Negotiating Safety and Sexual Risk Reduction with Clients in
Unsanctioned Safer Indoor Sex Work Environments: A Qualitative Study, 102 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH
1154, 1154 (2012) ("The incidence of physical violence, including homicide and rape,
continues to be significantly higher among street-based sex workers compared with any other
population of women globally."); Murphy & Venkatesh, supra note 22, at 139-4o (finding that
roughly forty percent of indoor sex workers had experienced violence, as opposed to eighty
percent of street prostitutes); Jason Prior et al., Sex Worker Victimization, Modes of Working, and
Location in New South Wales, Australia: A Geography of VictimizationJ. SEX RES. (forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript at 1, 10-12), available at www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/lo.lo80/oo22 4 4 99.
2012 .668975 (reviewing other studies that suggest that indoor prostitution is safer than street
prostitution, and reporting results of research finding that geographical location matters less in
terms of safety than how much situational control the mode of prostitution gives to the
prostitute); Sudhir Venkatesh, Do High End Sex Workers Have It Easier?, FREAKONOMICS (Mar. 18,
2oo8, 1:07 PM), http://www.freakonomics.com/2oo8/o3/18/how-glam-is-the-high-end-ask-a-
sex-worker [hereinafter Venkatesh I] (reporting that high-end escorts experience physical
abuse roughly twice per year); Sudhir Venkatesh, Five Myths About Prostitution, WASH. POST
(Sept. 12, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/201o/o9/Io/
AR20100 9 10026 7 o.html (reporting that "the population of women choosing sex work has
changed dramatically over the past decade," and that indoor prostitutes are less likely to
experience violence than street prostitutes).
170. Ronald Weitzer, Sex Work: Paradigms and Policies, in SEX FOR SALE: PORNOGRAPHY, AND
THE SEX INDUSTRY, supra note 22, at 1, 1 o.
171. Some evidence suggests that independent prostitutes using technology may be safer
than other forms of indoor prostitution such as brothel prostitutes or those working for an
escort agency. See, e.g., O'Doherty, supra note 167, at 957 ("Women may be safer when they are
able to structure their working environments and deal directly with potential clients.").
172. Ronald Weitzer, Sociology of Sex Work, 35 ANN. REV. SOC. 213, 219 (2009).
173. SeeJudith Kilvington et al., Prostitution Policy in Europe: A Time of Change?, 67 FEMINIST
REV. 78, 84 (2001) ("[D]evelopments in the sex industry make it easier to work less visibly
including the use of the Internet to advertise services .... ).
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no need to physically see independent prostitutes and their operations. The
public displays required to attract customers in streetwalking are eliminated,
replaced by online ads that cause no immediate harm to any given
community.
Prostitution 2.0 has also diminished-but not eliminated 74--the
externality of disease. A recent empirical study suggests that Internet-
enabled prostitutes engage in high-risk sex acts less frequently than
traditional street prostitutes: only 6.1 percent of all transactions studied
involved unprotected penetrative sex, whereas other studies show that 79 to
97 percent of street prostitution involves such acts.,75 One can imagine
various explanations for this difference. Indoor prostitutes may have more
leverage to bargain with clients seeking such risky sex. Or, the lower cost of
sorting and signaling may separate the market such that indoor, higher-end
prostitutes primarily serve clients not seeking such acts. 76 Finally, it could be
that the new ability of clients to communicate through online review sites
forces prostitutes with STDs out of the market because clients can post about
STD transmission on such sites.,77 Conversely, perhaps prostitutes can more
easily avoid infected clients because of blacklists or references from other
prostitutes. It is difficult to know without further research. At first blush,
however, it seems that Prostitution 2.0 may have somewhat weakened this
traditional objection to sex markets.
3. Effects on Coercion
Overall, Prostitution 2.o also seems less coercive than traditional street
prostitution. Empirical study suggests that Internet-enabled, independent
174. See infra Part II.C (discussing the limits of this improvement).
175. See Scott Cunningham & Todd D. Kendall, Risk Behaviours Among Internet-Facilitated Sex
Workers: Evidence from Two New Datasets, 86 SEXUALLY TRANSMITrED INFECTIONS iii00, iii l01
(2010) (finding that "sex workers who use the internet to solicit and communicate with
customers" are different from street-based workers, and that they see lower volume of clients,
more repeat clients, and engage in high-risk sexual activities less frequently"); Jason Chan &
Anindya Ghose, Internet's Dirty Secret: Assessing the Impact of Online Intermediaries on the
Outbreak of Sexually Transmitted Diseases 17-19 (Apr. 6, 2012) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2o3 5 5 85 (reporting results of
an empirical study of the impact of Craigslist on sexually transmitted disease incidence, and
finding that Craigslist led to increase in AIDS and syphilis cases, but from casual sexual
encounters, not prostitution); Scott Cunningham & Manisha Shah, Does Decriminalization of
Indoor Prostitution Reduce Sexually Transmitted Infections? Evidence from the Rhode Island
Experiment 21-23 (Jan. 31, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (finding
lower rates of gonorrhea in Rhode Island when only public solicitation was prosecuted but
indoor prostitution was essentially legalized).
176. See Charrlotte Seib et al., The Health of Female Sex Workers from Three Industry Sectors in
Queensland, Australia, 68 SOC. SC. & MED. 473, 475 (2009) (finding that private sex workers
were offered extra money for sex without a condom far less frequently than street prostitutes).
177. See Cunningham & Kendall, supra note 175, at iii o4 (suggesting this possibility).
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prostitutes are generally better educated,7s more middle class, and less
drug-dependent or otherwise compromised'79 than street walkers.so Koken's
study of thirty independent escorts, for example, found that: "Unlike
previous samples of street based sex workers, although most women in this
sample [of independent indoor escorts] expressed financial motivations for
entering sex work, none reported being forced or coerced into the work by
pimps or traffickers, and none reported working primarily to support a drug
habit."',' Likewise, Bernstein's work on "middle class prostitution" suggests
that sellers in Prostitution 2.o are more likely to come from economic
conditions that support an inference of free choice rather than coercion. '
82
If such findings are accurate, they diminish the power of coercion
arguments against Prostitution 2.o.'83 Of course, some discount entirely the
possibility that prostitution can ever be a real or free choice.'84 This seems to
ignore that the new market conditions of Prostitution 2.0 may attract both
buyers and sellers from very different backgrounds than traditional street
prostitution. In addition, Prostitution 2.o's diminished information
asymmetries allow higher-end sellers to drive less qualified, educated, or
178. See Cunningham & Kendall, supra note 3, at 284 (suggesting that roughly forty percent
of indoor prostitutes are college graduates); Cunningham & Kendall, supra note 2o, at 261
(reporting that indoor prostitutes have more often than not grown up in households with some
higher education, "with over 64% of mothers having at least some college exposure"); Juline A.
Koken, Independent Female Escort's Strategies for Coping with Sex Work Related Stigma, 16 SEXUALITY &
CULTURE 209, 226 (2012) (finding that a sample of thirty independent escorts "was well
educated and many women were actively pursuing career goals outside of sex work," unlike
typical samples of street prostitutes); Venkatesh, supra note 166 (studying 29o escorts in New
York and finding that 86% had finished high school; 53% had some college experience; and
19% had a college degree).
179. See, e.g., WEITZER, supra note 3o , at 28-35 (reviewing studies showing that indoor
prostitutes are less likely to come from abusive backgrounds, less likely to be psychologically
traumatized by their work, and more likely to have multifaceted social interactions with their
clients); Bungay et al., supra note 54, at 15 (reporting results of a study of indoor sex workers
and rejecting the binary distinction between seeing sex workers as victims of structural
coercion, on the one hand, or as free agents exercising choice, on the other). There is some
evidence that Internet-enabled male prostitution is also safer than street prostitution. See
generallyJ.T. Parsons et al., The Use of the Internet by Gay and Bisexual Male Escorts: Sex Workers as Sex
Educators, 16 AIDS CARE 1021 (2004).
s8o. See Lever & Dolnick, supra note 22, at 191-99; Seib et al., supra note 176, at 476
(finding that street prostitutes had more background mental health issues than indoor
prostitutes and were four times more likely to report poor mental health).
18l. See Koken, supra note 178, at 226 (citations omitted).
182. See Elizabeth Bernstein, Sex Work for the Middle Classes, io SEXUALITIES 473, 474-77
(2007).
183. See Satz, supra note 63, at 66 ("Many critics of prostitution have assumed that all
prostitutes were women who entered the practice under circumstances which included abuse
and economic desperation. But that is a false assumption: the critics have mistaken a part of the
practice for the whole.").
184. See, e.g., KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROSTITUTION OF SEXUALITY 33 (1995) ("Can women
choose to do prostitution? As much as they can choose any other context of sexual
objectification and dehumanization of the self." (emphasis omitted)).
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financially secure prostitutes out of the market. All of this may result in a
new sex market that is less coercive than traditional street prostitution.'S5
4. Effects on Objectionable Commodification
Finally, Prostitution 2.0 lessens the various types of objectionable
commodification, as compared to traditional street prostitution.
Individual Denigration. Early empirical studies suggest that Prostitution
2.0 is far less denigrating to individual sellers than street prostitution.
Prostitution 2.0 may be more financially and psychologically rewarding than
other forms of sex work; Internet-enabled prostitutes often see their work as
a career with professional implications and undertones; and Prostitution
2.0's improved working conditions reduce the degrading aspects of such
prostitution.
86
Internet-enabled prostitutes may feel increased self-efficacy because
they can set their own hours and control their work environment.'8 7 Some
evidence suggests that such work creates less psychological stress or burnout
than street prostitution.,8 8 In addition, because indoor sex work is less visible
than street prostitution, such sex workers may be able to engage in "passing"
or "covering" strategies to avoid or reduce the stigma commonly associated
with prostitution.I8 9 In other words, Prostitution 2.o's new technologies not
185. See Murphy & Venkatesh, supra note 22, at 134 ("The decision to engage in sex work
may be a fairly rational choice by women: namely, given their qualifications and the state of the
market, they realize that they are able to earn more money in sex work than other available
jobs."); Eva Rosen & Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh, A "Perversion" of Choice: Sex Work Offers Just
Enough in Chicago's Urban Ghetto, 37J. CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 4 17, 417 (2008) ("[I]n specific
social contexts of limited labor market opportunities, [the] decision [to engage in sex work]
can be rational.").
186. See Murphy & Venkatesh, supra note 22, at 131 ("[S]ex work in New York . . . is
undergoing an important shift as more women find themselves moving from the streets to areas
indoors. The patterns of earning, exposure to violence and physical abuse, relations with other
sex workers, conception of the work, and the overall tenure of participation (including
opportunities for exit) have changed for those involved.").
187. See Veena N., Revisiting the Prostitution Debate in the Technology Age: Women Who Use the
Internet for Sex Work in Bangkok, 11 GENDER, TECH. & DEV. 97, 105-06 (2007) ("[T]he Internet
has increased [Thai sex workers'] agency in the work. While their choices are constrained by
their circumstances, the Internet helps women to: protect their identity and thereby avoid social
stigma; increase their earnings by removing the pimp and retain control over their lives by
deciding when, where and how they will offer what services.").
188. See, e.g., Roberta Perkins & Frances Lovejoy, Healthy and Unhealthy Life Styles of Female
Brothel Workers and Call Girls (Private Sex Workers) in Sydney, 2o AUSTL. & N.Z.J. PUB. HEALTH 512
(1996) (finding that independent escorts reported better physical health and healthier
lifestyles than brothel prostitutes); Ine Vanwesenbeeck, Burnout Among Female Indoor Sex Workers,
34 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAv. 627 (2005) (finding some psychological depersonalization among
indoor sex workers, but not other forms of psychological distress or burnout, and noting that
they generally experienced fewer problems than street workers). But see Farley, supra note 2, at
956 (citing studies indicating that non-escort types of indoor sex work-such as strip club or
massage parlor prostitution-show higher rates of psychiatric symptoms).
189. SeeKoken, supranote 178, at 211 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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only reduce information asymmetries and externalities, but also open up
new means for prostitutes to avoid feelings of degradation or
commodification.
Indoor sex workers may also feel more of a positive professional identity
than street prostitutes, and view their work as a career:
The work begins to shape their identity in ways other than feelings
of shame and stigmatization. They begin to define the work not
only in terms of the exchange of sex for money, but in terms of
other components, such as the relatively autonomous character of
the employment relationship, the free time that the work affords;
and because of this flexibility, their ability to cultivate other
interests, their ability to "be good at what [they] do," and so on.
Moreover.... the longer women stay in the trade, the more salient
their identities as "sex workers" become and in turn, the more
likely sex work actually takes on the structure of a profession and a
career.'90
Again, this contrasts with traditional forms of prostitution.
As part of that careerist orientation, women engaged in Prostitution 2.0
report more therapeutic connection to their clients.19- In comparison, street
prostitutes rarely express feelings of attachment to their clients.192 Elizabeth
Bernstein argues for this benefit of Prostitution 2.0 in her ethnographic
study of prostitutes in five cities.93 She claims that Internet-enabled
prostitution can take on a therapeutic tone, which enriches the work
experience:
During the era of industrial capitalism in which the institution of
modern prostitution in the West was consolidated, what was
typically sold and bought in the prostitution encounter was an
expedient and emotionally contained exchange of cash for sexual
release.... In contrast to this, within the postindustrial paradigm
of (new) middle-class sex work... what is bought and sold
frequently incorporates a great deal more emotional, as well as
physical labour within the commercial context.'94
igo. Murphy & Venkatesh, supra note 22, at 143 (alteration in original).
191. For a general discussion of the idea of prostitution as sexual therapy, see Sibyl
Schwarzenbach, Contractarians and Feminists Debate Prostitution, 18 N.Y.U. REv. L. & SOC. CHANGE
103, 125 (199o-1991) ("The idea that commercial sex can have a therapeutic value is not as
far-fetched, nor as 'ad hoc,' as it may seem at first glance.").
192. See Murphy & Venkatesh, supra note 2 2, at 142.
193. SeeBernstein, supra note 182, at 482-83.
194. Id. (citation omitted).
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Prostitution 2.0'S sex workers sometimes discuss their emotional
attachment to their clients, as well as the healing nature of their work.'95
Indeed, some studies suggest that as much as forty percent of interactions
between buyers and independent escorts do not involve physical sex at all.19
6
As Bernstein has noted, this "complicate[s] the view that the
commodification of sexuality is transparently equatable with the erasure of
erotic and emotional intimacy."'97 In addition, it suggests that for at least
some prostitutes, Internet-enabled sex work may be more psychologically
enriching than street prostitution.
All of this-better working conditions, the ability to avoid stigma, and
careerist or therapeutic experiences-suggests that women involved in
Prostitution 2.0 may not experience the same degradation that makes street
prostitution seem particularly objectionable. Additional study is obviously
needed. Nevertheless, this first version of the commodification objection
seems less powerful in the Prostitution 2.0 context.
Social Commodification. Even if individual prostitutes do not experience
objectionable commodification, prostitution may still harm social relations
as a whole if it degrades our norms and practices about sex, intimacy, or
women generally. What of this type of commodification?
This has always been a difficult argument to make. Martha Nussbaum,
for example, rejects as "repugnant" the idea that some women should be
forbidden from pursuing sex work just to ensure that others can retain their
ideal of love.g 8 But even if one accepts the argument at face value,
Prostitution 2.0 weakens this objection. For prostitution to debase our
norms and ideals about sex, the mere fact that someone somewhere is
buying or selling sex must impact how we think and feel about sex in our
own lives. Moreover, that impact must be negative-the existence of a sex
market must make us believe that all sex, including our own sexual
experience, is about market exchange rather than love, or that all women, in
particular, are commodities to be traded for pleasure. For this
generalization to occur, however, there must be a negative valence to our
view of market sex; we must feel negatively about the market transactions
that are occurring before we could translate that to all non-market sexual
interactions. Similarly, for the existence of a sex market to degrade our views
of all women, women in that market must be treated as base commodities.
To the extent that Prostitution 2.o has cleaned up sex markets, however, it
may reduce these basic negative feelings about market sex and change our
195. See Janet Marie, Working Well: Women's Experience of Managing Psychological
Wellbeing as Sex Workers 138 (2009) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Massey University) (on file
with author) (reporting a small survey and finding that "sex workers clearly understood their
work to have meaning beyond that of being a sexual object while at work").
196. See Venkatesh I, supra note 169.
197. Bernstein, supra note 182, at 486.
198. See Nussbaum, supra note 41, at 714.
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view of the women that participate in such exchange. There should,
therefore, be less of a negative association to generalize to all sexual
relations or all women.
The argument that prostitution inherently degrades our views of
women thus seems less powerful in the context of Prostitution 2.o. Given the
conditions under which women must labor in traditional street prostitution,
the argument that the mere existence of such labor reinforces negative, base
views of women has some traction. Permitting women to participate in
violent, unhealthy, powerless work does seem degrading to women
generally. To the extent that Prostitution 2.o has reformed sex markets,
however, this argument weakens. If the market conditions of Prostitution 2.0
are no longer nasty and brutish, then the fact that women choose to
participate as sellers in that market does not degrade women generally, any
more than a woman's choice to participate in any other relatively safe and
healthy market degrades women generally.
C. THE REMANNG PROBLEMS WITH PROSTITUTION 2.0
At this point, the improvements of Prostitution 2.0 should be clear:
technology has created Internet-enabled, indoor sex markets, and this has at
least partially ameliorated each of the four main objections to prostitution.
New sorting and signaling mechanisms lessen information asymmetries that
plague traditional prostitution. Moving sex work off the streets removes
externalities by making prostitution less visible, and increased bargaining
power seems to give prostitutes the ability to avoid higher-risk sex acts and
unhealthy clients, thereby lessening disease. New technologies permit price
differentiation, thereby making Prostitution 2.o more financially rewarding
(at least for more successful prostitutes), and fewer sellers seem
economically coerced into these markets. Finally, improved working
conditions weaken commodification objections, given that the subjective
experience of many prostitutes in these markets may be relatively positive
and that social norms-about sex or women-seem less likely to be seriously
degraded by Prostitution 2.o.
Some believe that these improvements suffice.199 If market conditions
have so progressed that each of the four criterion is satisfied then continued
prohibition may rest only on lingering irrational feelings of disgust left over
from our rejection of traditional forms of prostitution. ° No independent
grounds may remain for rejecting Prostitution 2.o.-o1 But have market
99. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
2oo. See Krawiec, supra note 78, at 1744 (arguing against coercion and commodification
objections and concluding that only unjustified repugnance and disgust explain antipathy to
prostitution).
201. See id. at 1741 ("[S]ocial and legal impediments to taboo trades sometimes serve no
purpose other than constraining normal market functioning or denying providers the status of
legitimate suppliers of a valuable good or service.").
2013] 2027
IOWA LAW REVIEW
conditions so progressed? Consider several doubts, organized in our familiar
categories.202
1. Remaining Information Asymmetries & Externalities
Prostitution 2.0 lessens many of the historical information asymmetries
that plague markets for sex. At the same time, it is not at all clear that
Prostitution 2.o has overcome these asymmetries sufficiently to remedy the
information-related failures in prostitution markets. At the deepest level,
one should want interactions about all sex-commercial or non-
commercial-to be as fully informed as possible.2o3 At the very least, one
should not want material information asymmetries to make such
interactions excessively risky to either sexual partner. Prostitution should
not be the equivalent of Russian Roulette. Unfortunately, two material
information asymmetries remain in Prostitution 2.o: whether either the
buyer or seller has an STD that could endanger the other, and whether
either the buyer or seller is likely to engage in criminal activity-violence,
blackmail, etc.-that could endanger the other.
Although some evidence suggests that Prostitution 2.o's buyers and
sellers engage in high-risk sex acts less frequently than traditional street
202. The early empirics on indoor prostitution have noted some concerns with Prostitution
2.o, but they are often somewhat trivial. It may be that most work on indoor prostitution
generally takes on a pro-liberalization view, and therefore that the negatives have been
overlooked. Regardless, the empirical literature does mention some concerns. One concern is
that that indoor prostitutes-like street prostitutes-do not report their illegal income and may
thus fail to establish credit or save sufficiently. See Murphy & Venkatesh, Vice Careers, supra note
22, at 135. A second concern is that, because Prostitution 2.0's technologies allow women to
work independently, they may become socially isolated and not interface or form social
networks with other sex workers. See id. at 144 ("Our study... finds a high degree of social
isolation for women working indoors."). Third, indoor prostitutes may gain a false sense of
security, believing that only street prostitutes face risks of violence or arrest. See id. at 140.
Fourth, indoor sex workers may be less able or likely than street prostitutes to access relevant
social services, which are often offered to prostitutes through outreach programs-such as
outreach vans-that are unable to locate indoor sex workers. See id. at 147. Fifth, indoor sex
workers may be less interested in exiting prostitution because the improved work conditions of
Prostitution 2.0 make other career options seem less attractive. See id. at 148 ("Many women
stated ... that available, legitimate employment was usually a 'step down,' offering fewer wages,
flexibility, and job satisfaction."). Finally, stigma remains, and that "covering" to avoid such
stigma increases stress. See Koken, supra note 178, at 212 ("Though passing, and thus protecting
themselves from the loss of status that may accompany revelation of their stigma, the individual
with concealable stigma may... engage in high levels of hypervigilence and self-monitoring in
social situations.").
203. Debra Satz has put forth five conditions that she believes must be met to ensure that
legalized prostitution takes place under market conditions that would guarantee women's
equality. See Satz, supra note 63, at 84 ("In order to promote women's autonomy, the law needs
to ensure that certain restrictions-in effect, a Bill of Rights for Women-are in place.").
Among these, Satz argues for the condition that "[t]he law should ensure that a woman has
adequate information before she agrees to sexual intercourse." Id.
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prostitutes,204 Prostitution 2.0 is far from perfect in this regard. In
Prostitution 2.o, a prostitute can use Internet-enabled information to guess
whether her client is likely to carry infection,05 but she has no direct means
to verify this likelihood. The same is true from the client's perspective: a sex
buyer can guess-based on the signals of education level, sophistication,
cleanliness, etc. that he receives from a prostitute-the likelihood that she
will expose him to an STD, but he has no knowledge of the many factors
(e.g., length of time working as a prostitute, number of clients seen a week,
willingness to engage in high-risk sex acts with others) that would help him
make that determination in an informed way. Even with the improvements
of Prostitution 2.o, both sex sellers and sex buyers remain in the dark about
these health risks. Although they may believe that they can accurately predict
such risks, they may well be wrong. Guessing someone's STD status based on
a few email exchanges or Google searches is a fraught proposition.
The same holds for information about criminal propensity. Again, some
evidence suggests that Prostitution 2.0 is safer than street prostitution, and
that prostitutes in these new markets experience less violence.2o 6 This is an
unqualified good. At the same time, we have very little real data on rates of
violence, rape, and abuse within Prostitution 2.0 populations.207 If
Prostitution 2.0 is safer, this is most likely due to the better sorting and
signaling made possible by the Internet. Again, however, prostitutes and
potential clients must "read the tea leaves" to determine the likelihood of
victimization. If a prostitute can screen a potential client by talking to
another prostitute for a reference, learning about the client online, or
emailing with the client, this undoubtedly provides more information about
that client's propensity towards violence than is available to a street
prostitute. It remains incomplete, however. Similarly, when a client can read
reviews of a prostitute on The Erotic Review, read the prostitute's blog
entries, or email with the prostitute, the client can somewhat gauge whether
she is likely to blackmail or otherwise defraud him. Again, however, such
assessment is far from fully informed.
Information about criminal propensity remains imperfect in
Prostitution 2.0 because identity remains imperfectly disclosed. Prostitutes
almost never disclose their true names or identities to clients. Thus, the
reviews that a client can read online must necessarily refer to a pseudonym.
This makes it possible for a prostitute to change her online identity-or
maintain multiple online identities--to camouflage herself if she victimizes a
client.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 165-71.
205. See supra note 177 and accompanying text.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 165-71
207. See R. BARRI FLOwERS, PROSTITUTION IN THE DIGITAL AGE: SELLING SEX FROM THE
SUITE TO THE STREET 25 (20 1) (describing examples of escorts being raped and assaulted).
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The same is true of clients. As explained, many prostitutes now require
that a potential client submit a name, employment information, or other
identifying information in order to be screened prior to meeting in
person.20 8 It is easy to imagine violent or criminal clients, however, finding
ways around such screening mechanisms. A client could construct an
artificial online identity, for example, by using a secondary email account.
Or a client could give the prostitute the name and personal information of
another person-stealing that person's identity for the sake of verification.
At the time of their face-to-face meeting, the prostitute has little way to
ensure that the client standing in front of her is the online persona she
researched and verified.
Moreover, despite screening, prostitution clients continue to hide
behind pseudonyms and screen names. The National Blacklist, for example,
contains thousands of reports on bad clients, but most of them do not list
the client's real name.2 0 9 Instead, reports generally list just a first name
(e.g., "Don," "Jason," etc.), a phone number, or an email address.21o Screen
names, phone numbers, and email addresses can easily be changed,
however. The lack of robust identity information reduces the efficacy of
blacklist sites and screening mechanisms.
Legalization of Prostitution 2.0 in its current form could only partly
overcome these remaining information problems. If Prostitution 2.0 were
legalized, prostitutes and clients could make representations and warranties
that they did not carry STDs and that they had no criminal history. Such
representations and warranties, however, would do little to reassure either
sellers or buyers. A client, for example, does not just want damages in the
event that a prostitute gives him a sexually transmitted disease-he wants to
be able to prevent that infection. Likewise, a prostitute does not merely
hope for compensation in the event that a client is violent-she wants to be
able to avoid such clients and prevent her own victimization. These
information asymmetries would therefore remain, even if Prostitution 2.0
were legal.
2. Remaining Coercion
Prostitution 2.o also only incompletely solves coercion problems. As
discussed, evidence suggests that Internet-enabled prostitutes generally
come from more educated, wealthy, and stable backgrounds, reducing the
likelihood that their participation in such markets is a result of economic or
other coercion.21, Although positive, this does not eliminate all concerns
2o8. See Murphy & Venkatesh, supra note 22, at 140 (describing screening in detail); Ray,
supra note 1 2 1, at 57-58 (similar).
209. See Incident Blotter, NAT'L BLACKuST, http://www.nationalblacklist.com/browse_
registry.aspx (last visited Feb. I 1, 2013).
210. Seeid.
211. See supra notes 177-79 and accompanying text.
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about coercion. As Susan Dewey recently put it, "It is problematic to imply
that women compelled for whatever reason to engage in sex work do not
make choices designed to improve their lives materially, but it is even more
dangerous to argue that they are agents free of coercion by poverty and
other limiting circumstances."12
Although in the aggregate Internet-enabled prostitutes may be more
educated and better off financially than street prostitutes, such statistics do
nothing to inform an individual transaction between a buyer and a seller.
There is little way for a buyer, for example, to know whether a particular
prostitute came from an economically (or otherwise) coercive background,
lives currently in coercive circumstances, or suffers from serious hardship
that makes suspect her choice to prostitute herself. The client does not know
her history in any way-whether she has been abused in the past, for
example, or suffers from mental or emotional instability or from drug
addiction. Most important, the client has no idea whether the prostitute may
be a victim of sex trafficking. In short, the client is hiring an unknown.
This lack of information about coercion or trafficking seriously weakens
the legitimacy of Prostitution 2.0. In normal legal markets, contract law does
not require that one contracting party know everything about the other, but
it does require some basic level of care that one is not transacting with a
minor, an incompetent, or an incapacitated counterpart.1 s If one ignores
these limits, one bears the risk of the transaction (because the counterpart
can avoid the contract).214 Similarly, employment law imposes on employers
a duty to exercise care during hiring to avoid retaining employees with a
past criminal history.-5 If an employer does not exercise such care, it may be
liable for the future bad acts of that employee.21 6
212. SusAN DEwEY, NEON WASTELAND: ON LOvE, MOTHERHOOD, AND SEX WORK IN A RUST
BELT TOWN xvi (2011).
213. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 4.2-4.8 (4 th ed. 2004). Contract law does
not take this intuition very far: the doctrine of economic duress continues to require that one
party impose a wrongful threat on the other, as opposed to allowing a party experiencing
economic duress to avoid a contract regardless of whether the counterparty explicitly used that
duress against it. See id. § 4.19.
214. See id. §§ 4.2-4.8.
215. See Michael A. Curley & Adam M. Greenfield, Negligent Hiring and Related Claims, in
NEGLIGENCE IN EMPLOYMENT LAW 25, 29-30 (Alfred G. Feliu & Weyman T. Johnson eds.,
2002).
216. See id. British criminal law likewise provides a defense to statutory rape if a defendant
can show that he reasonably believed-particularly after due diligence-that his sexual partner
was of age. See Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42, § 9 (U.K.). Put differently, in cases of doubt,
the law requires some investigation into the age of a consenting sex partner. U.S. law is less
clear. See Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public Welfare Offense
Model 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313, 344-50 (2003) (providing an overview of state laws on mistake-of-
fact defenses in statutory rape). In general, U.S. law imposes strict liability for statutory rape,
shifting the burden even more clearly to investigate the age of a sexual partner. See id. at 318.
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I do not invoke these doctrines to suggest that they apply per se, but
instead to highlight the principle embedded within them: we sometimes
require a contracting party to investigate the status of its counterpart,
particularly when circumstances suggest that the counterpart may be
vulnerable. Extrapolating only slightly from these doctrines, it seems
reasonable to suggest that in a market as fraught with the potential for
vulnerability as the market for sex, we might demand not only that coercion
be absent in the aggregate, but that buyers and sellers be able to determine
and prove that coercion is absent in a given exchange. The existing
technologies of Prostitution 2.o do nothing to so inform prostitution
markets.
Legalization of Prostitution 2.0 would not remedy this problem. Were
prostitution legal, the state could license Internet-enabled prostitutes after
determining that each was competent and entering sex work freely. Such
licensure would certainly help with this lingering coercion problem. It is not
clear, however, how such a licensing regime would work. As Sheila Jeffreys
has recently noted, modern technology-enabled prostitution raises a unique
problem for licensing regimes designed to improve the working conditions
of prostitutes: by allowing prostitutes to be independent of pimps and
brothels, Prostitution 2.0 simultaneously may make it more difficult to use
licensing to clean up prostitution markets.s'7 Jeffreys concludes that without
brothels as the locus of legalized prostitution activity, regulatory reform of
the industry is impossible. AsJeffreys puts it:
[T]he escort boom makes legalization obsolete, its purposes
unachievable. Legalization is based on the notion that prostitution
should take place in legal brothels which will have to obey some
state regulation to ensure the safety of the prostituted women from
health risks and violence, and the male buyers from sexually
transmitted diseases (STDs). The escort industry is beyond
regulation. It operates through mobile phones and delivers women
to private houses, hotel rooms, and even cars... , worksites which
cannot be made "safe."
218
As Part III shows, I disagree with Jeffreys' conclusion that independent
prostitution cannot be made safe.,9 Her basic observation about the
difficulty of monitoring such prostitution is valid, however. Pointedly, even if
Prostitution 2.0 were legal and the state licensed independent, technology-
enabled prostitutes, what would guarantee that clients would care? In the
217. SeeJeffreys, supra note 38, at 211 ("Legalization policies, founded on the idea that
prostitution will usually take place in brothels, set up special regulatory systems by which
brothels can acquire licenses and create conditions of operation, such as... health [] and safety
plans .... ").
218. Id. at 216.
219. See infra Parts III.A-B.
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privacy of a hotel room or apartment, how could the state ensure that
licensing requirements were observed or that prostitution did not continue
without such licensure? This standard approach to minimizing coercion
problems in a legalized regime seems hamstrung by the very technology
potentiallyjustifying legalization in the first instance.
3. Remaining Commodification
Finally, consider lingering doubts about commodification. As discussed,
in some ways Prostitution 2.0 seems to present less objectionable
commodification than traditional prostitution. Nevertheless, Prostitution 2.0
presents two new commodification issues of its own that warrant discussion.
First, sites such as The Erotic Review provide detailed descriptions of
the physical attributes of thousands of prostitutes, narratives about the
services they perform, and rating scales designed to aid clients as they seek
prostitution services. 22o This explicit rating of prostitutes may seem a
particularly offensive development: not only are prostitutes commodified
through the sale of sex itself, but they are then crassly discussed online as if
they were actual commodities.
This objection to Prostitution 2.0 has some merit-even a cursory
reading of some of the reviews on such sites underscores just how crude and
objectifying such peer-to-peer ratings can be. At the same time, this
objection must deal with the modern reality of ratings generally. Many
things are now rated, as are many people serving in many professions.221 You
can judge your professors at RateMyProfessors,222 your plumber at Angie's
List,223 your lawyer at Avvo,224 or your doctor at RateMDs.22 More crudely,
you can rate your girlfriend226 or ex.227 In other words, online rating of
others has become relatively commonplace. Any objection based on the
commodification inherent in rating another's sexual services would either
have to distinguish prostitution ratings as unique or address and reject this
more widespread commodification of all services. Neither seems a strong
position.
At a deeper level, however, Prostitution 2.0 does not solve the
commodification problem. The commodification objection to traditional
220. See supra notes 1o6-07 and accompanying text.
221. See Peppet, supra note 25, at 698-703 (discussing the phenomenon of consumer
ratings).
222. See RATEMYPROFESSORS.COM, http://www.ratemyprofessors.com (last visited Mar. 19,
2013).
223. SeeANGIE'SLiST, http://www.angieslist.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
224. SeeAVVo, http://www.avvo.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
225. See RATEMDs.COM, http://www.ratemds.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
226. See RATE GIRLFRIENDs, http://www.rategfs.com (last visited Feb. 11, 2013). More
crude still, see RATE YOUR RACK, http://new.rateyourrack.com (last visited Feb. i1, 2013).
227. See RATE MY EX GIRLFRIEND, http://ratemyexgf.com (last visited Feb. 1 1, 2013).
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streetwalking was that it subjected women to such base market conditions
that it both degraded individual prostitutes and undermined social views of
women generally. To the extent that Prostitution 2.0 improves those market
conditions, this objection falls away. But the remaining information
asymmetries in Prostitution 2.o-particularly about STDs, criminal
propensity, and the risk of trafficking-seem material. Although they have
better information than they once did, prostitutes must still work under
extremely risky conditions with very little verified information about these
important aspects of the transactions in which they partake. Although they
may demand identifying information from their clients, this information
may be faked with little consequence, and their interpretation of available
data on such a client may not accurately reveal these risks. In all, Prostitution
2.o remains a flawed market. As a result, one may still-as in Prostitution
i.o-fear that permitting it degrades our views of women generally. To
overcome this fear requires improving prostitution further, beyond the
advances of Prostitution 2.o. That is the subject of the next Part.
III. THE POSSIBILITIES OF PROSTITUTION 3.0
Let us summarize the argument to this point. Technology allows
prostitutes to advertise, screen clients, and be screened by clients in new
ways that reduce transaction costs and allow prostitutes and clients to sort
and signal each other more efficiently than before. These changes to the
underlying economics of prostitution have in turn reduced the information
asymmetries, externalities, coercion problems, and commodifying effects of
traditional prostitution. Prostitution 2.0 seems safer, healthier, less socially
visible or obnoxious, less coercive, and more rewarding than streetwalking
or other forms of indoor prostitution. At the same time, concerns remain. In
particular, Prostitution 2.o does not eliminate all troubling information
asymmetries between prostitutes and clients-particularly about health risks,
criminal propensity, and trafficking.
On balance, I find these concerns sufficiently serious to make
legalization or decriminalization premature. In particular, the ongoing
information asymmetries between even the most technology-enabled
prostitutes and clients raise the troubling possibility that Prostitution 2.0
markets are less well-functioning than some have suggested. Although these
markets may be better than Prostitution i.o, they do not yet seem good
enough. It is hard to characterize the transactions that occur in Prostitution
2.o as adequately informed about these material risks. In addition, the
relative paucity of empirical evidence tilts the balance towards caution.
Granted, at least some of the evidence we have about Prostitution 2.0 is
positive. Nevertheless, there is much we do not know, and those gaps should
give pause.
At the same time, Prostitution 2.o has shown that further innovation
may itself be justified. Although Prostitution 2.0 may not be good enough, it
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suggests that a further-improved Prostitution 3.0 might be. This justifies
exploring the possibility of Prostitution 3.o. What further technological
upgrades would be needed to remedy the remaining problems with
Prostitution 2.0? What legal reform would be needed to effect such
upgrades? And would such reform be a net social positive?
Even asking such questions stands in stark contrast to current trends in
prostitution-related law enforcement and policy. Law enforcement has
vigorously targeted Prostitution 2.0 technologies in order to suppress online
communication related to prostitution.-2s Most notably, various state
prosecutors have attacked Craigslist for facilitating prostitution, sometimes
threatening criminal prosecution under state statutes.2 9 In 2oo8, for
example, forty state attorneys general demanded that Craigslist remove its
adult-services advertisements.230 Craigslist responded by beginning to charge
for such postings and by requiring an identifying credit card,3'1 which
significantly decreased adult-services advertisement on the site.2 32 In 2010,
Craigslist removed the adult-services section completely.233
More recently, the website Backpage has come under attack for hosting
prostitution advertising.2s4 In 2012, for example, the State of Washington
enacted a requirement that any online site allowing personal ads should
guarantee that users were at least eighteen years of age.2 35 This requirement
was targeted directly at Backpage, which immediately brought suit to enjoin
the new requirement as a violation of its federal rights. The Washington
Attorney General's Office settled the case and promised to work with the
legislature to repeal the law.23
6
228. See Thomas J. Holt et al., Examining the Displacement Practices of Johns with On-line Data,
36 J. CRIM. JUST. 522, 527 (2oo8) (discussing strategies for law enforcement in online
environments).
229. See Shahrzad T. Radbod, Note, Craigslist-A Case for Criminal Liability for Online Service
Providers?, 25 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 597, 6o8-1i (2010) (describing prostitution-related
litigation).
230. See id. at 6o8. See generally John E.D. Larkin, Criminal and Civil Liability for User Generated
Content: Craigslist, a Case Study, 15 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 85 (2010).
231. See Brad Stone, Craigslist Agrees To Curb Sex Ads, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2oo8), http://www.
nytimes.com/2oo8/11/o7/technology/internet/o7craigslist.html.
232. See Cunningham & Kendall, supra note 2o, at 252-54 (reporting results of a study of
Craigslist adult-services ads indicating that policy change had a dramatic effect).
233. SeeJulie Adler, Note, The Public's Burden in a Digital Age: Pressures on Intermediaries and
the Privatization of Internet Censorship, 20J.L. & POL'Y 231, 232 (2011) (discussing Craigslist and
censorship of its adult-services section).
234. See Matt Stroud, Backpage.com and the Prostitution Law that Could Take Down Twitter,
YouTube, and Wikipedia, VERGE (June 18, 2012, 1:54 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2o 2/6/
18/30931 4 6/backpage-com-prostitution-law-take-down-youtube-twitter-wikipedia.
235. An Act relating to advertising commercial sexual abuse of a minor, ch. 138, 2012
Wash. Sess. Laws 1037.
236. See Greg Allmain, Washington Settles Lawsuit ly Backpage over Escort Ads, FED. WAY




Finally, law enforcement has also targeted prostitution review sites. In
2002, for example, Florida prosecutors brought criminal charges against the
owners, operators, and users of one prostitution review site-
BigDoggie.net237 The Erotic Review has likewise come under scrutiny,238
and various commentators have urged Congress to further pressure such
Internet services by stripping them of the immunity from prosecution
currently afforded them by Section 230239 of the Communications Decency
Act.240
I do not wish to defend Craigslist, Backpage, BigDoggie.net, or The
Erotic Review. Each has its shortcomings, particularly the troubling reality
that such Prostitution 2.0 services are sometimes used to facilitate coercive
trafficking. At the same time, ignoring the potential benefits of such
technologies is short-sighted. Although Prostitution 2.o's nascent
technologies are imperfect, they improve on Prostitution 1.o. We should not
seek to suppress them, but instead ask whether further innovation might
improve again on their initial advances.
Such further innovation will require legal reform, however. In addition
to targeting existing Prostitution 2.0 technologies, we can assume that law
enforcement will try to block or inhibit future innovation in this sector.
Various legal barriers stand in the way of such innovation, including state
statutes criminalizing activity that "advances" or "promotes" prostitution.241
These statutes could easily be used against those creating technologies in
this context. The threat of such prosecution almost certainly has a chilling
effect on potential innovators of prostitution-related technologies. This
chilling effect may be unjustified: if Prostitution 3.0 could so overcome the
basic objections to liberalization of prostitution markets, then inhibiting
such innovation seems in itself unjustified.
To set the stage and show the ways in which future technologies might
remedy the remaining problems of Prostitution 2.0, Part III.A first considers
four technologies that might form the core of Prostitution 3.0. In each case,
the focus is not on a particular piece of hardware or software, but on the
economic or informational function that Prostitution 3.o requires. Part III.B
237. See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & ROBERT F. MEIER, SOCIOLOGY OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 350
(14 th ed. 201 1) ("In an unusual move, Florida prosecutors charged not only the sex workers
advertised on the Web site, but also the Web site owners and registered users of the site.").
238. See Matt Richtel, Sex Trade Monitors a Key Fgure's Woes, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2oo8),
http://www.nytimes.com/2oo8/o6/17/us/17erotic.html?_r=i (describing the legal entanglements
of the founder of The Erotic Review).
239. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2006).
240. See, e.g., Nathan Assel, Advertising Prostitution: Potential Criminal Liability for Craigslist, 25
SYRACUSE SC. & TECH. L. REP. 77 (201 s) (arguing that Internet intermediaries such as
Craigslist should be stripped of immunity); Abby R. Perer, Note, Policing the Virtual Red Light
District: A Legislative Solution to the Problems of Internet Prostitution and Sex Trafficking, 77 BROOK. L.
REV. 823, 824-25 (2012).
241. See infra Part III. B.
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then lays out the legal reforms that would be required to permit such
innovation. Finally, Part III.C considers whether it is worth pursuing
Prostitution 3.0, objections to that pursuit, and the realistic possibilities for
those interested in prostitution reform.
A. PROSTITUTION3 .0'S TECHNOLOGIES
To overcome the remaining problems in sex markets, Prostitution 3.0
requires four innovations: (1) verification of STD status; (2) verification of
criminal history; (3) verification of anti-trafficking credentials; and (4)
biometric identity verification. These four technologies could change
prostitution from a market in which prostitutes and clients must guess at
material information to one in which such information becomes routinely
available. To understand these changes, consider each innovation in turn.
1. Verification of STD Status
A prostitute and client have no low-cost way to share verified health
information. Even if each knows that he or she carries no STDs, it would be
difficult to convince the other of that fact. Any attempt to do so would be
merely "cheap talk."242
A technology-enabled intermediary can change this by facilitating
sharing of verified health information. Services like Qpid show that such
verification is possible.243 Others are innovating with such STD verification
systems using mobile technologies. In February 2012, for example, Chec-
Mate launched an iPhone and Android application that securely stores STD
test results on your phone to facilitate sharing with a potential sex partner.2 44
A user uploads a personal photo to Chec-Mate, as well as contact
information for the testing facility the user visits. Chec-Mate then sends a
result verification screen to the user's phone. The screen contains the user's
image (so that when the user shares the screen with a potential partner, the
partner can verify that the results belong to the user) and test results. 245
Legal scholars have begun to show interest in the public health
advantages of such technology. Mary Fan, for example, has written recently
about the possibility of creating a national STD database to provide
242. SeeJoseph Farrell & Matthew Rabin, Cheap Talk, J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1996, at 1o3,
104 (defining "cheap talk" as "ordinary, informal talk" through which "information sharing" is
accomplished).
243. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text (describing Qpid). A few other STD
verification services have emerged, but none have gained as much traction. See, e.g.,
CHECKTONIGHT, http://www.checktonight.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2013); SAFE SEX PASSPORT,
http://www.safesexpassport.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).




information about STD status to others in real time.24 6 Although focused on
dating culture, not prostitution markets, Fan's work is directly applicable.
She argues for low-cost means to share information with a potential partner
about one's STD status,247 for a public health campaign to create a "culture
of verification,"24 8 and for more effective legal penalties for those who
repeatedly and knowingly spread STDs to others.49
A robust health verification system like this could provide new
regulatory opportunities for improving prostitution markets. If such a system
was widely used in non-prostitution contexts-among those just casually
dating, for example-it could likewise be used (or required) by prostitutes
and clients. Moreover, it is quite likely that if such systems became culturally
normalized, a prostitute's or client's unwillingness to use such a verification
regime would itself signal a health concern. This might drive those with
sexually transmitted diseases out of the market, or make it far more difficult
for them to engage in risky sex acts likely to transmit infection.5
2. Verification of Criminal History
Likewise, a technology-enabled intermediary could provide prostitutes
and clients with more robust information about criminal history and
propensity for violence than they could obtain through Prostitution 2.0's
technologies. This information could come from two sources. First, the
Internet has greatly reduced the cost of criminal background checks. Such
checks are now far more comprehensive than in the past, and available
cheaply. With valid information about a prostitute or client's identity, an
Internet intermediary could easily provide such basic criminal history.
Second, Prostitution 2.0 shows the power of peer-to-peer information
sharing and reputational markets. If a customer has been violent in the past,
the prostitutes he has hired will have the best information about that
propensity for violence. Similarly, if a prostitute is a drug addict or has stolen
from a client, peer-to-peer information will best reveal those problems.
246. See Mary D. Fan, Decentralizing STD Surveillance: Toward Better Informed Sexual Consent, 12
YALEJ. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 1, 28 (2012) ("[IT]he way forward is to seed private-public
partnerships that put power and information in the hands of the people in order to facilitate
truly informed decisionmaking and consent . . . ."); see alsoJames M. Helmink, Note, Sexually
Transmitted Identification, 6 I/S:J.L. & POL'V 569, 583 (2010) (advocating for the creation of a
sexually transmitted disease identification system).
247. See Fan, supra note 246, at 30.
248. Id. at 3o-31.
249. See generally Mary D. Fan, Sex, Privacy, and Public Health in a Casual Encounters Culture, 45
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 531 (2011).
250. As in many markets, an "unraveling effect" might kick in: as those without disease
became comfortable sharing their health status through such a system, the market for
disclosure would unravel, forcing all to disclose. For a discussion of unraveling in information
markets, see Scott R_ Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat of a Full-
Disclosure Future, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 1153 (201 1).
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Prostitution 2.0'S peer-to-peer networks, such as prostitution review sites
and the National Blacklist on customers, suffer from imperfect identity
tracking. A prostitute or customer can easily change her online "handle" or
username, and thus can evade the reputational consequences of bad
behavior. As a result, Prostitution 2.0 imperfectly shares information
between peers about bad actors in the prostitution market.
Prostitution 3.0 could solve this problem by more tightly managing
identity information. In Prostitution 3.o, both prostitutes and clients would
have to share their actual identity with the Internet intermediary to gain
access. This allows for stable tracking of reputational information.
3. Anti-Trafficking Analysis
An intermediary with accurate identity information could also attack
Prostitution 2.0's lingering trafficking problem. Again, in Prostitution 2.0
clients have little means to verify that a prostitute that advertises online is
actually of age, legal, and non-coerced. More pointedly, a client has no way
to know whether the individual that actually appears for their in-person
meeting is the individual the client researched online. Digital and physical
identity remain too weakly linked, thus opening the door for trafficking to
exploit Prostitution 2.o and give such coercive prostitution a false gloss of
legitimacy.
Prostitution 3.0 must address trafficking. This problem will be more
challenging, however, than either health or criminal background
information, for a simple reason: there is no verified data source on which
to draw to determine whether an individual has been coerced into
prostitution. One can check a prostitute or client's STD status through
medical testing, or criminal history through a background check. But there
is no simple means to verify anti-trafficking credentials.
However, the problem is not intractable. In combination, various data
about an individual can likely be combined to estimate the probability that
the person is vulnerable to trafficking or is actually consenting to
prostitution. Various data points could feed such analysis: whether the
person is a U.S. citizen with a verified passport or social security number;
whether she has a verified college education; whether she is transient or has
a record of leases or home ownership showing stability in her living
arrangements over time; whether she has any medical history of drug
problems; whether her financial records and credit rating indicate
reasonable financial stability; or whether her name appears on any
trafficking "watch lists." These data may not be perfect indicators of
trafficking, but it seems likely that they can reveal a risk of trafficking in most
cases-at least in the United States where reasonably reliable information is
available about most individuals.
In addition, the mere existence and use of Prostitution 3.0's verification
systems will likely impact trafficking markets in the United States. Traffickers
2013] 2039
IOWA LAWREVIEW
will likely avoid Prostitution 3.0's system because of its reliance on actual
identity and stable identity management over time, which may lead to
detection. This will deprive traffickers of access to all of the benefits of
Internet technologies, such as online advertisement and prostitution review
sites. Traffickers will no longer be able to "pass" trafficked victims off as
consenting prostitutes by using online media to advertise and advance their
services. Instead, trafficking will be forced off the Internet and back to less-
effective traditional means of advertising and promotion. The creation of a
sound Prostitution 3.0 market may be the most effective means of
combatting the coercive trafficking market. 251
Some will argue that liberalization of consensual prostitution will always
exacerbate coercive trafficking.252 Recent arguments against prostitution
have tended to make this link to trafficking.53 These arguments have had
measurable policy impact: Rhode Island, for example, recently
recriminalized indoor prostitution after almost thirty years of permitting it,
in part due to advocacy by anti-trafficking groups.2 54 Some disagree,
objecting that there is insufficient empirical evidence to establish this link.255
I can neither dispute nor verify the connection between consensual
prostitution and trafficking: this is an empirical question that requires
continued study. Even assuming that legalizing prostitution today would
251. For an excellent economic model showing that legalizing voluntary prostitution may
be the best way to combat coercive trafficking, see Samuel Lee & Petra Persson, Human
Trafficking and Regulating Prostitution 3 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working
Paper No. 12-o8, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=
2057299 ("[S]afeguarding voluntary sex work is instrumental, possibly even crucial, in
eradicating trafficking....").
252. See, e.g., Janie A. Chuang, Rescuing Trafficking from Ideological Capture: Prostitution Reform
and Anti-Trafficking Law and Policy, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1655 , 1664 (2010) (discussing the ways in
which abolitionists have transformed the anti-trafficking movement into an anti-prostitution
movement); Michelle Madden Dempsey, Sex Trafficking and Criminalization: In Defense of Feminist
Abolitionism, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1729, 1746-47 (2010) (conceding that some people may
genuinely consent to selling sex and may benefit from such transactions, but concluding that
prostitution should nevertheless be prohibited because the value of prostitution does not
outweigh its harms).
253. See generally Niklas Jakobsson & Andreas Kotsadam, The Law and Economics of
International Sex Slavery: Prostitution Laws and Trafficking for Sexual Exploitation, 35 EUR. J.L. &
ECON. 87 (2013) (finding less trafficking in prohibition jurisdictions).
254. See generally Cunningham & Shah, supra note 175 (describing the change in Rhode
Island law).
255. See generally Robert Uy, Blinded by Red Lights: Why Trafficking Discourse Should Shift Away
from Sex and the "Perfect Victim"Paradigm, 26 BERKELEYJ. GENDER L. &JUST. 204 (201 1) (arguing
that prostitution and trafficking are not synonymous); Ronald Weitzer, Sex Trafficking and the Sex
Industry: The Need for Evidence-Based Theory and Legislation, 1o J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1337
(2012) (arguing against the "mythology of trafficking"); Gail M. Deady, Note, The Girl Next Door:
A Comparative Approach to Prostitution Laws and Sex Trafficking Victim Identification Within the
Prostitution Industry, 17 WASH. & LEEJ. CIVIL RTs. & SOC.JUST. 515 (2011) (arguing that there is
little empirical evidence in the United States tying prostitution to sex trafficking, and that
continued prohibition actually exacerbates rather than ameliorates trafficking).
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facilitate trafficking, however, one might nevertheless endorse the possibility
of permitting prostitution-related innovation before legalizing Prostitution
3.0 in the future. To satisfy the four criteria discussed in Part I-particularly
the coercion criterion-Prostitution 3.0 would have to "solve" the trafficking
problem. The best way to fight trafficking would be to create low-cost means
to verify the identity of a prostitute-to know her history, nationality and
age, for example, so that one could ensure that she was not a trafficking
victim. Such information would allow clients to distinguish a consensual
prostitute from a trafficked victim-and give the state means to regulate,
monitor, and enforce rules against engaging in prostitution with such
victims.
Technology may thus be an answer to trafficking, just as it may be an
answer to prostitution.25 6 I do not mean to suggest that trafficking is merely
caused by a lack of information about identity-it is a complex problem. But
information deficit is a factor in trafficking. If Prostitution 3.0's technologies
can reduce that deficit, it may contribute to eliminating coercive sex
markets.
4. Biometric Identity Verification
As discussed, it is currently clumsy to link a physical human being to her
identity. For the most part, we rely on identification documents, such as a
driver's license or passport, to prove that we are Person X as opposed to
Person Y. Online, of course, such verification can be difficult: a thief with
your credit card information can easily transact online because there is no
way to verify whether you are initiating the transaction. We increasingly
resort to passwords and verification questions (e.g., mother's maiden
name?) to provide increased security, but such mechanisms are relatively
easy to compromise. This break between one's physical self and one's true
identity poses particular problems in prostitution. As discussed, the weak
link between physical and digital identity perpetuates in Prostitution 2.0 at
least some of the information asymmetries that plague traditional
prostitution.
Biometric identity verification technologies can solve this problem by
more closely tying together physical and digital identity. In just the last year,
for example, facial recognition technologies have gone from science fiction
256. Technology is already being deployed to fight trafficking. See MARK LATONERO,
HUMAN TRAFFICKING ONLINE: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES AND ONLINE CLASSIFIEDS
23-30 (201 1), available at http://technologyandtrafficking.usc.edu/files/2o /og/Human
TraffickingFINAL.pdf (describing three studies using technology to detect trafficking by
analyzing online advertisements and Twitter feeds, and the difficulties of such techniques);
HAO WANG ET AL., DATA INTEGRATION FROM OPEN INTERNET SOURcEs TO COMBAT SEX
TRAFFICKING OF MINORS 248 (2012), available at http://dI.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=23o7
769&bnc=1 (click PDF icon to download full article) (describing the "TrafficBot" system for use
by law enforcement to trawl open Internet sources for references to trafficking).
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to mainstream. Consider a startling example. In July 2011, privacy
economist Allessandro Acquisti demonstrated a prototype of an iPhone
application that could take a photograph of a person, compare that
photograph to the millions of public profile pictures available through
Facebook, and, if a match were found, guess the person's name.2 57 The
application succeeds a staggering thirty percent of the time.25 s Acquisti notes
that this application is an example of augmented reality that uses both
offline and online data.259
Related advances in iris recognition technology also promise to more
closely link physical and digital identity.26° EyeLock, for example,
manufacturers an iris scanner that plugs into a USB port and is about the
size of a pencil.26, The device can verify a person's identity, so long as the
person's iris has already been scanned into an online database.262 Iris
scanning technology is advancing quickly.26 3 For example, police
departments around the United States have already begun deploying
commercial iPhone-based iris recognition (and facial recognition)
applications to identify criminals in the field.264
For Prostitution 3.0 to succeed, biometrics must be used to verify a
person's identity without publicly revealing that identity. This is
"intermediated" biometric identity verification-the use of biometric devices
to privately identify a person, determine whether that person meets certain
criteria, and then reveal the answer to that determination without
necessarily revealing their identity itself. Return to the Qpid example
discussed above.265 Although Qpid certainly holds promise to reduce STD
transmission, one can easily imagine ways around the system. You could steal
or borrow a friend's Qpid code, for example, if you had not had an STD test
in a long while or if you had tested positive for an STD. In the prostitution
257. See Alessandro Acquisti et al., PowerPoint Presentation: Faces of Facebook: Privacy in
the Age of Augmented Reality, at slides 25-30 (Aug. 201 1), available at http://blackhat.com/
docs/webcast/acquisti-face-BH-Webinar-2o 12-Out.pdf.
258. See id. at slide 3o.
259. Id. at slide 25.
260. SeeJulia Angwin, Iris Recognition: The New Fingerprinting?, WALL ST.J. DIGITS BLOG (July
13, 2011, 11:4o AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2oil/07/1 3 /iris-recognition-the-new-
fingerprinting/ (discussing improvements in iris recognition technologies).
261. SeeEYELOcK, http://www.eyelock.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
262. See FAQ's, EYELocK, http://www.eyelock.com/faqs.aspx (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
263. See Christopher R. Jones, Note, "eyePhones": A Fourth Amendment Inquiry into Mobile Iris
Scanning, 63 S.C. L. REV. 925, 929-30 (2012) (describing development of iris recognition
technologies).
264. See id. at 929-30 (describing police applications); Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, Device
Raises Fear of Facial Profiling, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2011, 5:34 PM), http://online.wsj.com/
article/SBo0001424o527o23o36787o457644o2533o7985o7o.html ("Dozens of law-enforcement
agencies from Massachusetts to Arizona are preparing to outfit their forces with controversial
hand-held facial-recognition devices.. ").
265. See supra text accompanying notes 1 1-19.
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context, an STD-verification system would be ineffective if so easily
subverted. Such a system would be far more powerful, however, if combined
with biometric identification. You could simply iris scan a potential
prostitute or client, and Qpid (or a similar system) could return that
person's test results without revealing the person's name.
Thus, the first three necessary technologies-verification of STD status,
verification of criminal propensity, and verification of anti-trafficking
credentials-all require intermediated biometric identification to truly make
Prostitution 3.0 succeed. Only if prostitutes and clients can be reassured that
the physical person they are transacting with is the person that they digitally
verified will Prostitution 3.0 improve prostitution markets..
66
B. INCREMENTAL PRosTITUTIoN 3.O LEGAL REFORM
These technologies show how Prostitution 3.0 might function. Clients
and prostitutes could verify each other's credentials while maintaining
anonymity. These technologies could greatly reduce disease, violence, and
trafficking-the three major remaining problems with Prostitution 2.0.
To make Prostitution 3.o a reality, however, will take more than
technological innovation. It will require capital investment by firms able to
create the data management structures necessary to effect STD verification,
criminal propensity verification, and anti-trafficking verification, as well as to
incorporate biometric identification hardware into their systems. It will
require coordination between such firms and policy-makers to define the
boundaries of the confidentiality obligations and qualified privilege that will
provide the legal form for Prostitution 3.0. And it will require that various
firms that might only tangentially be involved in Prostitution 3.0
nevertheless permit their hardware and software platforms to be used in this
fashion. Think of Apple Computer's iTunes store, for example. If
Prostitution 3.0 is to incorporate mobile, location-based technologies, Apple
would have to approve such an application through its iPhone application
development process. Were Chec-Mate or Qpid to launch an iPhone app
targeted at prostitutes and their clients, Apple would have to approve.'5 7
Even if Apple is not itself involved in creating Prostitution 3.0, it-and many
other firms that control the basic infrastructure of much of today's
266. In addition to these four necessary technologies, other technologies may undoubtedly
contribute to Prostitution 3.0. I do not have the space to review them all here. Two contenders
are location-based mobile matching of prostitutes with clients and sensor-based detection of
disease. For a discussion of location-based technologies, see infra Part III.C.2 (discussing the
ways in which such technologies may improve street prostitution). On sensor-based disease
detection, see John D. Sutter, Mobile Phones May Diagnose STDs, CNN (Nov. 9, 2010, 2:44 PM),
http://edition.cnn.com/2o1o/TECH/innovation/i i/og/diseases.mobile.phone/ (describing
research on chips that can detect STDs from a urine or saliva sample, and deployment efforts
using smartphones).
267. See supra notes 243-45 and accompanying text (describing Qpid and Chec-Mate).
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information technology-must be willing to allow Prostitution 3.0's
components to function on its proprietary systems.
Prostitution 3.0 will thus be more complicated to create than was
Prostitution 2.0. This Subpart suggests that four types of legal reform would
be necessary to create Prostitution 3.0. First, policy-makers would have to
remove legal barriers to prostitution-related innovation, particularly state
laws criminalizing such efforts. Second, we would have to create a regulatory
apparatus to structure and guide firms that serve important roles as
information intermediaries in Prostitution 3.0. In particular, reform would
have to create confidentiality obligations, neutrality requirements, a limited
evidentiary privilege, and reporting obligations in cases of violence or fraud.
Third, as Prostitution 3.0 innovations came online, we would have to tighten
existing laws-such as the Communications Decency Act-that allow less
rigorous Prostitution 2.0 services to remain immune from prosecution.
Finally, reform would ultimately culminate in simultaneously legalizing
Prostitution 3.0 while criminalizing the purchase of sex outside of
Prostitution 3.0's parameters, so long as these previous incremental steps
towards implementing Prostitution 3.0 provided evidence that the new
market was sufficiently improved to justify decriminalization.
i. Removing Legal Barriers to Innovation
Various legal barriers currently inhibit prostitution-related innovation.
Perhaps most potent, many states have criminalized activity that advances
prostitution 268 or promotes prostitution,269 other than as a prostitute or a
client of prostitution. In most cases, this is defined as activity that "causes or
aids" a person in engaging in prostitution, "procures or solicits patrons for
prostitution," or "engages in any other conduct designed to institute, aid or
facilitate an act or enterprise of prostitution."270 Other states only ban
solicitation without this wider prohibition on "other conduct,"27, but define
solicitation broadly in ways that might include online facilitation of
268. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-70-101(1) (West 2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-85 ()
(2 o1 1); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1356(1) (West 2olo); HAW. REv. STAT. § 712-1201(1) (1993
& Supp. 20 1i); KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 529.01 o() (West 2006 & Supp. 2012); N.Y. PENAL LAW §
230.150) (McKinney 2oo8); WAsH. REv. CODE § 9A.88.o6o(i) (2010 & Supp. 201 1).
Note that these state requirements differ from a federal requirement that
nongovernmental organizations involved with HIV/AIDS treatment and education sign a
pledge not to advocate or "promote" prostitution. That pledge has been the subject of First
Amendment litigation. See Sung Chang, Prostitutes + Condoms = AIDS?: Leadership Act, USAID, and
HHS Guidelines'Failure To Define "Promoting Prostitution," i9J. GENDER, SOC. POL'Y & L. 373, 376-
79, 384-85 (201 1) (discussing the requirements and litigation). These state requirements, on
the other hand, do not compel speech but instead prohibit actions that advance or promote
prostitution activities.
269. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 567.010(1) (West 2012).
270. N.Y. PENALLAW§ 23o.1 5(0).
271. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-7-202(1) (West 2004 & Supp. 2012).
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prostitution.272 Still others prohibit "[a]rranging for prostitution," which
generally "means any act to procure or attempt to procure or otherwise
arrange for the purpose of prostitution, regardless of whether such
procurement or arrangement occurred or a fee was paid."273
These criminal statutes might obviously deter someone from developing
or commercializing prostitution-related technologies. Such laws have been
used against Prostitution 2.0-they were employed in the Craigslist
litigation, for example, as well as in the prosecution of prostitution-review
sites.274 It seems highly unlikely that corporate-technology firms would risk
violating such laws to adopt or promote a prostitution-related advance.
As a first step, reformers could seek to amend state statutes that
currently criminalize activity "advancing" or "promoting" prostitution. Such
statutes could be amended to include the following language:
"Advancing prostitution" does not include conduct that provides
information or information technology to those engaging in or procuring
prostitution or that facilitates, develops, or promotes the use of such
technology, so long as such technology materially benefits the health, safety,
or welfare of its users or the community.
This statutory change would exempt from prosecution entities
providing advertising services to prostitutes, maintaining prostitution-review
websites, or developing prostitution-related mobile applications. It would
allow the Gates Foundation to try their smart card experiment in the United
States, or Qpid to incorporate iris scanning technology into a prototype for
use in prostitution markets.
If desired, a state could add the following proviso:
and so long as such activity is conducted by a legally recognized not-for-
profit entity.
This proviso would no doubt inhibit innovation by limiting protected
activity to non-profit entities. It could be a useful compromise, however, for
states in which building political consensus around prostitution reform
proves difficult. Removing the profit motive by limiting innovation to non-
profit service agencies might reassure some that such technologies would be
created and deployed in ways that meet the public's interest in improving
prostitution markets rather than meet private interests in exploiting existing
inefficiencies.
Federal law would also have to change somewhat. In particular, the
Internal Revenue Service might need to clarify that tax-exempt non-profit
272. See id. (defining "soliciting for prostitution" to include "solicit[ing] another,"
"arrang[ing] a meeting of persons," or "direct[ing] another to a place ... for the purpose of
prostitution").
273. See, e.g.,D.C. CODE§22-27o.o1(1) (2oo1 &Supp.so12).
274. See supra notes 230-34 and accompanying text.
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organizations can innovate in this context. Historically, tax-exempt non-
profits risk their tax status if they engage in or support illegal activities or
activities not in the public interest.76 Non-profits cannot be organized to
violate criminal law or induce the commission of a crime.276 Consider the
example of the Gates Foundation's experiment with prostitution "smart
cards" in India.277 Had the Gates Foundation conducted that test in the
United States, its non-profit status could have been at risk. Other non-profits
have faced similar constraints. For example, the sex work advocacy group
SWOP-USA is developing an iPhone application called "Safe Call" to help
sex workers stay safe.278 It has run afoul of New York's ban on prostitution-
related activities.79
This limitation on non-profit prostitution-related innovation could be
changed by exempting non-profit activity that "facilitates, develops or
promotes" information technology for use by those in the prostitution
context. 8o The IRS could take such action without Congress; it would
merely have to reinterpret its existing revenue rulings. This change would
allow the non-profit sector to participate in creating Prostitution 3.0.
2. Regulating Prostitution 3.0 Intermediary Firms:
Confidentiality, Neutrality, Privilege, & Reporting Requirements
To this point, my description of Prostitution 3.o has relied heavily on
firms playing the role of information intermediaries between prostitutes and
customers. This follows a basic Coasean line of reasoning: when transaction
costs are high, firms arise to replace or assist those markets.2 8, In particular,
intermediaries arise in markets marred by excessive transaction costs,
particularly information asymmetries. 82 Often they add value by providing
new information to a market.s83 Dealers in antiques or fine art, for example,
275. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983); Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2
C.B. 204; Rev. Rul. 71-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230.
276. See Rev. Rul. 75-384, 1975-2 C.B. 204.
277. See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
278. See Stephen Nessen, Reluctant To Turn to Authorities, Sex Workers Attempt To Safeguard
Against Crime, WNYC NEWS (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.wnyc.org/articles/wnyc-news/2o1 1/
apr/13/sex-workers-reluctant-work-police-long-island-investigation/ (describing the SWOP-USA
application and problems with New York law).
279. See id.
28o. Non-profits receiving federal anti-AIDS or anti-trafficking funding currently must
adopt a policy opposing trafficking and prostitution. 22 U.S.C. §§ 76o1(1)-(23), 7631(f)
(2oo6). This does not seem to pose much threat to prostitution-related innovation, but may be
another federal statute that needs modification.
281. SeeR.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937).
282. For an excellent overview of intermediation in various markets, see Daniel F. Spulber,
Market Microstructure and IntermediationJ. ECON. PERSP., Summer 1996, at 135, 136-41.
283. See Patrick C. Leyens, Intermediary Independence: Auditors, Financial Analysts and Rating
Agencies, 11 J. CORP. L. STUD. 33, 36 (2011) ("Intermediation . . . fulfil[I]s its transaction-
enabling function by adding to the information level available to a party.").
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may certify the quality of good to be traded, reassuring the buyer and seller
of its authenticity. This information-verification or information-provision
service can add sufficient value to allow the intermediary to charge a fee for
its services.2S4
In addition, intermediaries can add value by filtering information out.
Sometimes Party A fears exploitation if Party B learns Party A's identity.
Party A may avoid transacting with B for fear of B's future use (or abuse) of
A's participation in a strategic way. An intermediary can again assist. The
intermediary can step between A and B and help them transact together
without fully revealing A's identity to B, or vice versa. The third party can
filter identity-related information to protect privacy while still passing other
transaction-relevant information on to the other side.2
85
Prostitution 3.0 could use both of these intermediary functions. Firms
could verify information about prostitutes and clients in order to reduce
information asymmetries. At the same time, intermediaries could verify
information without revealing the identity of either party to either party,
thus reducing the moral hazard problems presented by prostitution.
To be effective, however, an intermediary must secure the trust of both
parties.2s 6 To establish that trust in this sensitive context would require more
than merely reputation-building by intermediary firms-it would require
legal obligations to assure prostitutes and clients that their information is
secure. The second step in the incremental strategy of Prostitution 3.0 legal
reform would thus be to create the legal background conditions for strong
Prostitution 3.0 intermediaries to arise. This would require creating legal
obligations for such intermediaries to maintain the confidences of
prostitutes and clients; requiring:such intermediaries to maintain neutrality,
favoring neither prostitutes nor clients; creating an evidentiary privilege to
protect information in the hands of such intermediaries; and creating
regulatory oversight of Prostitution 3.0.
Confidentiality Obligations. For prostitutes and clients to trust Prostitution
3.0 firms, those firms must protect their clients' sensitive information.
284. On certification intermediaries generally, see Gary Biglaiser & James W. Friedman,
Adverse Selection with Competitive Inspection, 8 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 1, 1-2 (1999)
(modeling the role of middlemen in inspecting quality of goods in a market with
heterogeneous buyers and sellers); Gary Biglaiser, Middlemen as Experts, 24 RAND J. ECON. 2 12,
212-13 (1993) (arguing that middlemen capable of inspecting goods and establishing a
reputation for honesty reduce transactional impasses); Yiting Li, Middlemen and Private
Information, 42 J. MONETARY ECON. 131, 132 (1998) (modeling how middlemen arise to address
adverse selection problems and arguing that "[pirivate information concerning the quality of
goods may be the driving force behind intermediation in several markets in the real world").
285. See Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2191, 2200 (1996)
(discussing how an intermediary can transmit information from an informer without revealing
the informer's identity, serving as a "useful filter").
286. See id. at 2219-25 (discussing why voting is rarely intermediated in general elections
because of the lack of a trusted third party).
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Unfortunately, existing Internet intermediaries-such as Google, Facebook,
and others-are not subject to confidentiality requirements or regulations,
nor does competition seem to produce them.287 Instead, each firm decides
in its privacy policy how to handle user information. In the context of
prostitution, however, it seems wise to set standards, akin to the fiduciary
obligations owed to beneficiaries by a trustees 8 so that intermediaries
cannot water down their privacy policies and sell their users' data.2S9
Neutrality. For Prostitution 3.0 intermediaries to function, they will have
to be neutral as between clients and prostitutes. If either prostitutes or
clients believe that such an intermediary is biased towards the other, they
will not share information with the intermediary. This already has been a
problem with Prostitution 2.0 intermediaries. Recent litigation over a Texas-
based prostitution review site provides an example of the neutrality problem.
The Escort Client Community Information Exchange ("Eccie") is an active
review site like The Erotic Review and has location-specific prostitution
communities, including one focused on Texas.29o For several years, an
anonymous blogger with the handle "Ty Steel" has attacked Eccie for being
managed by several escort agencies, and thus being biased.291 In May 2012,
Eccie sued Ty Steel in Texas court, seeking to reveal Steel's identity and
enjoin what it sees as further defamation.292 Ironically, Eccie also seeks to
avoid revealing the actual identity of its owners and managers-thus
continuing to raise suspicion that it and other entities like it may, in fact,
serve the escort community.293
Because Prostitution 3.0 services must face in two directions and serve
two sides of the market-both prostitutes and clients-they should be
subject to mediator-like neutrality requirements to remain impartial. They
should not accept payment predominantly from either the prostitution or
client communities nor be controlled by or have a significant financial stake
287. See, e.g., Frank Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition: The Need for Qualified
Transparency in Internet Intermediaries, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 105, 151 (2010) ("Competition is
often elevated as a solution to the privacy problem, but few Internet intermediaries do (or even
can) compete to grant users more privacy.").
288. Trust models have been similarly used to protect health information. See generally
Nicolas P. Terry & Leslie P. Francis, Ensuring the Privacy and Confidentiality of Electronic Health
Records, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 681, 723-24 (describing the fiduciary obligations of trustees to
keep confidences and applications to health records).
289. See Ralph Spencer Poore, Privacy and the Value of Personal Data, 9 INFo. SYSTEMS
SECURITY 1, 14-15 (2000) (discussing Internet intermediaries and raising the question of
whether to trust that they will keep data secure and private in the face of incentives not to do
so).
290. See ECCIE, http://www.eccie.net (last visited Feb. 11, 2013).
291. See Anna Merlan, Eccie, Texas' Prostitution-Review Web Site, Is Suing a Trash-Taming
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in other prostitution businesses such as escort agencies.294 Such basic
requirements would make it easier for prostitutes and clients to trust such
services.
A Qualified Evidentiay Privilege. In addition to the obligation to keep
confidences, Prostitution 3.0 requires the creation of an evidentiary
privilege to protect information held by such intermediaries.295 Absent
privilege, all of the various information needed to effect Prostitution 3.0-
including the basic fact that a given prostitute agreed to meet with a given
client-would be subject to discovery requests.296 Given the sensitive nature
of Prostitution 3.0 information, the inability to protect it from discovery
would likely prove fatal to the system's success.
In general, evidentiary privileges are of two types: topical (applying to a
certain class of information) or communicative (applying to information
communicated between two people).297 A topical privilege would be too
broad here because it would protect all prostitution-related information
even outside of the context of Prostitution 3.0's systems. A communicative
privilege applied only to those making use of Prostitution 3.0 would be more
fitting. It would protect only information communicated between a
prostitute (or client) and the Prostitution 3.0 intermediary. In this way,
prostitutes and clients could be further incentivized to make use of the
protections afforded by Prostitution 3.0.
Finally, the privilege should be qualified by an obligation for a
Prostitution 3.0 intermediary to disclose information to law enforcement in
the event that violence or fraud occurred during a prostitution transaction.
The privilege could not be used to conceal such violence or fraud. This
would guarantee that neither prostitutes nor clients could hide behind
Prostitution 3.0's information system. Moreover, the knowledge that
294. See generally Scott R. Peppet, Contractarian Economics and Mediation Ethics: The Case for
Customizing Neutrality Through Contingent Fee Mediation, 82 TEX. L. REV. 227, 261-69 (2003)
(describing neutrality requirements for mediators).
295. Jerry Kang and others have recently argued for such a privilege to protect the privacy
of personal information derived from sensors and other self-measurement technologies. My
argument is quite different here, but draws on the same reasoning vis-a-vis the need for a
privilege to protect the privacy of prostitution-related information. See Jerry Kang et al., Self-
Surveillance Privacy, 97 IOWA L. REV. 8o9, 831-33 (2012) (arguing for an evidentiary privilege to
protect "self-surveillance" information stored in a data vault); see also Scott R. Peppet, Privacy &
the Personal Prospectus: Should We Introduce Privacy Agents or Regulate Privacy Intermediaries, 97
IowA L. REV. BuLL. 77 (2012) (commenting on Kang's essay and arguing for the need to
protect information held by privacy intermediaries).
296. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b) (1) (providing that relevant nonprivileged material is
subject to discovery); see also Levmore, supra note 285, at 2233 (discussing the general problem
that disclosure to an intermediary may not in itself be protected by privilege or immunity and
noting that "the intermediary who was approached with the expectation of confidentiality may
be legally unable to abide by that expectation or social norm").




information could be disclosed in the event of violence or fraud might deter
such bad behavior in the first instance. Again, unlike in the purely
anonymous Prostitution i.o or 2.0, where a violent client, for example, can
escape because a prostitute does not know his true identity, in Prostitution
3.0 parties to a transaction would understand that their actions could be
traced back to them through the Prostitution 3.0 intermediary if they
behaved badly.
Regulatory Oversight. Finally, policy-makers could create a regulatory
backdrop for Prostitution 3.0 firms. This is not the same as the government
attempting to control Prostitution 3.o directly through licensing or running
an intermediary service itself. A regulatory cure is not necessarily the
appropriate solution.9 8 Particularly in prostitution markets, a government-
run solution would be subject to capture by interest groups that could make
the problem worse. 299 At the same time, pure self-regulation of firms without
any government involvement is rare, and seems particularly unlikely in a
sensitive market like prostitution.300
Regulatory oversight of Prostitution 3.0 firms could take various forms.
At the very least, such regulation could ensure that firms honor their
confidentiality commitments and protect users' information. More
generally, it seems likely that one massive Prostitution 3.0 intermediary may
come to dominate the market.301 There are network effects in play: the more
people use a particular verification service, the more information that
service will possess about both prostitutes and clients. As a result, that service
will become increasingly effective. In addition, Prostitution 3.0's
technologies will require significant capital investment. Verification of STD
status, criminal history, and anti-trafficking credentials-as well as
integration of biometrics-will require data storage and analysis capabilities,
legal compliance, and, of course, marketing. These investments will pay off
at scale, and may lead to one large intermediary "making the market" in this
context.
298. See Harold Demsetz, Information and Efficiency: Another Viewpoint, 12 J.L. & ECON. 1, 2-3
(1969) (describing the "nirvana fallacy" of assuming that government regulation can transform
an imperfect market into its more perfect form).
299. SeeJonathan R. Macey & Maureen O'Hara, From Markets to Venues: Securities Regulation
in an Evolving World, 58 STAN. L. REv. 563, 582-83 (2005) (discussing this problem in the
regulation of stock exchanges).
300. See Saule T. Omarova, Wall Street as Community of Fate: Toward Financial Industry Self-
Regulation, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 411, 445 (2011) ("There is a broad consensus among scholars
and policymakers that a key condition necessary for a self-regulatory regime to succeed is the
existence of a formal framework of government regulation and enforcement within which such
self-regulation exists. A 'pure' form of self-regulation without any government presence or
intervention is not realistic and is not commonly encountered in practice." (footnote omitted)).
301. Macey & O'Hara have compared the circumstances under which one dominant
exchange is more efficient than a market of multiple, competing exchanges. Macey & O'Hara,
supra note 299, at 585-88.
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There is precedent for such an intermediary: the New York Stock
Exchange ("NYSE"). The NYSE emerged as a dominant player in liquidity
markets, with a primary regulator-the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC")-providing oversight. Intriguingly, the NYSE was
organized as a non-profit corporation for more than 200 years. Diamond
and Kuan have argued that the NYSE's non-profit form helped it solve a
lemons problem in liquidity markets: that issuing firms-whose shares trade
on the exchange-might provide misinformation to investors; that investors
might not be able to distinguish truthful from dishonest issuing firms; and
that this might ultimately degrade the market, driving out good firms.so2 As
an intermediary, the NYSE could overcome this problem in two ways: by
conducting due diligence on issuing firms to screen out bad firms, and by
taking hostages to motivate truthful disclosure.sos In addition, they argue
that the NYSE could better serve this role as a non-profit than as a for-profit,
because a for-profit exchange would be motivated to increase trading
volume (to increase profits), rather than to carefully screen all participants
in the exchange.304
Their argument has analogs here. Regulators should attend to the
financial incentives of Prostitution 3.0 intermediaries, particularly the
possibility that they may try to "mine" or sell the data they hold, as other
Internet firms increasingly have. A non-profit structure may work best to
reassure prostitutes, clients, and regulators that Prostitution 3.0
intermediaries are not exploiting their users for gain.
3. Tightening Existing Safe Harbors Over Time
In a jurisdiction pursuing such incremental prostitution reform, the
next step would paradoxically be to begin tightening certain legal rules in
order to suppress non-Prostitution 3.0 sex markets and incentivize
participation in Prostitution 3.0. In particular, prostitution reformers should
reexamine existing safe harbors for Internet-related communications that
currently immunize certain types of prostitution-related technologies.
Specifically, Congress could amend 47 U.S.C. § 230305 over time to impose
certain substantive requirements on firms that facilitate peer-to-peer
prostitution-related communications.
Section 230 provides immunity for providers and users of an
"interactive computer service" who publish information provided by
302. Jennifer W. Kuan & Stephen F. Diamond, Using Hostages To Improve the Quality of
Financial Disclosure 3 (May 26, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract~id=1410377 (discussing the role of exchanges in
controlling lemons problems).
303. See id. at 6-7 (arguing that the NYSE's lock-up period on IPO shares served as a
hostage for insiders who might otherwise issue misinformation).
304. Id. at 7-8.
305. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2oo6).
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others.so6  Courts have generally upheld immunity for Internet
intermediaries, including cases in which sexually explicit content--such as
prostitution-related advertisements-has been posted on a website such as
Craigslist.s°7 In general, § 230 immunity is seen as absolute, even in
prostitution-related cases.3oS Several authors have therefore argued that
Congress should amend § 230 to strip its protections from Internet
companies that allow prostitution-related communications through their
sites.3o9 This has been in reaction to services like Craigslist and Backpage,
which are seen as facilitating trafficking.
My argument is at once similar and different. I agree that over time
Prostitution 2.0's Internet firms should begin to lose their CDA immunity in
order to suppress trafficking and other harmful forms of prostitution. I fear,
however, that Congress will succumb to pressure to remove immunity for all
prostitution-related communication. Instead, if Prostitution 3.o begins to emerge
and the evidence establishes that it is, indeed, a safer way to regulate and treat
prostitution markets, reformers could use § 230 to incentivize firms to upgrade
their services to the more robust requirements of Prostitution 3.0.
To do so, Congress could be encouraged to set out a timetable for
reform of § 230. It could declare that after two years, for example, § 230
would no longer protect prostitution-related communications unless the
firms facilitating those communications included at least one of Prostitution
3.0's four core technologies. In particular, § 230 immunity could be tied to
biometric identity verification. Without such identity verification,
Prostitution 2.0 services-such as online advertisements and prostitution
review sites-are too prone to abuse by sex traffickers. By connecting
continuing § 230 immunity to upgrading to Prostitution 3.0's standards,
Congress could simultaneously suppress trafficking and promote innovation.
4. Legalizing Prostitution 3.0 & Simultaneously Criminalizing the Purchase
of Sex Outside of Prostitution 3.0
Finally we come to the end of the innovation story. With legal barriers
to innovation removed, a legal and regulatory regime in place, and legal
incentives to participate, firms would hopefully emerge offering Prostitution
3.0's technologies. In that case, sex markets would be ready for a final
3o6. See id. § 230(c)(1) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be
treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information
content provider.").
307. See, e.g., Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
3o8. See Ashby Jones, How Can Craigslist Host 'Adult Services' Ads and Stay Out of Trouble,
WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Sept. 7, 2010, 5:27 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2oo/o9/o7/how-
can-craigslist-post-adult-services-ads-and-steer-clear-of-trouble/ (describing consensus that
online services face little threat of liability due to § 230).
309. See generally Assel, supra note 24o; Larkin, supra note 230; Perer, supra note 240;
Radbod, supra note 229.
2052 [Vol. 98: 1989
PROSTITUTION 3 .0 0
reform: legalizing Prostitution 3.0 while simultaneously criminalizing the
purchase of sex outside of its confines.
Lee and Persson have recently created a formal model of the impact of
legalization on trafficking, and concluded that criminalizing purchasing of
illegal sex is more effective at eliminating trafficking than criminalizing the
selling of illegal sex.3' ° Although they do not explore in detail, as I do, the
way to construct a reformed prostitution that could better guarantee
voluntary participation by prostitutes and screen out trafficking victims, they
note that for any two-track system to be effective there must be tough
penalties for prostitution outside of its confines.3" In particular, they show
that penalizing customers who purchase sex outside of a regulated market
may be the most effective approach.312
Space constraints do not permit an in-depth discussion here of the pros
and cons of penalizing clients as opposed to prostitutes that continue to sell
sex outside of Prostitution 3.o. It is possible that either approach-
continued criminal sanctions for both sellers and buyers or solely sanctions
for buyers-could work. The key final step in Prostitution 3.o's reforms,
however, would be legalization of sexual transactions that occur within its
parameters. If prostitutes and clients subject themselves to STD verification,
criminal history verification, anti-trafficking verification, and biometric
identity verification, their transaction could be legal.
I must stress, again, that I am not entirely convinced that such reform
would be wise, nor do I believe there is a slam-dunk prescriptive argument
for such reform. The final decision about whether to legalize prostitution
within the confines of Prostitution 3.0 must be evidence driven, not based in
hyperbole or speculation. As these technologies are developed and
deployed, evidence could be gathered to determine their effects on the
safety and welfare of sellers and buyers of sex, as well as on society generally.
If and only if those effects are deemed a net positive should this final reform
step occur.
C. FINAL ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST
Although disagreement will undoubtedly remain, I believe I have fairly
addressed the major positions likely to oppose my argument. Some believe
that all prostitution should be legal; I explained my disagreement in Parts I
and II. Some hope that Prostitution 2.0 suffices; I reject this in Parts I and
III, showing the material information that remains lacking in even the most
informed sex markets. Some will argue that even a fully realized Prostitution
3.0 fails to convince, and that prostitution markets can never "improve"
31o. Lee & Persson, supra note 251, at 5-6, 28.
31 1. See id. at 5.
312. See id. ("[A] sufficiently severe criminal penalty on [customers] who purchase illegal
sex can eliminate all demand for illegal sex and thus eradicate trafficking.").
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because they are fatally flawed. To this objection I offer an incremental
strategy of both technological innovation and legal reform, designed to
evolve these markets so that evidence can be gathered about whether
improvement is truly possible.
Finally, some scholars have argued for an informal solution: law
enforcement officials should just avoid prosecuting indoor prostitution or
the prostitution-related innovation that supports it.'13 In other words, the
argument is that Prostitution 2.o has sufficiently improved prostitution
markets to the point where we can stop paying attention to them. Law
enforcement should focus its efforts elsewhere and allow technologically
enabled Prostitution 2.0 to go about its business.
This Article obviously takes a different approach. I argue not only that
Prostitution 2.0's improvements do not suffice, but that a conscious, explicit,
planned reform strategy is required to move forward towards Prostitution
3.0. That reform strategy must combine technological innovation with legal
reform if it is to succeed. Most important, that reform should be incremental,
not sudden, so that as it proceeds we can research and analyze its effects.
The argument for such incremental technological innovation and legal
reform is grounded in our basic commitment to freedom of contract in a
liberal society. As a society, we have long been committed to the ideal that
contracting parties are best positioned to arrange their affairs and that
judicial intervention into those affairs is generally unwarranted absent
market failure or other concerns.s'4 If Prostitution 3.0's further innovations
can correct such market and moral failures in prostitution markets, the core
objections to freedom of contract in this domain will essentially fall away. To
respect our commitment to preserving liberty to the extent possible,s,5 we
should remove legal barriers to such innovation.3' 6
To do otherwise is to work in an unjustified circle. A liberal state must
have justification for criminalizing consensual market transactions. In this
context, the state justifies prostitution's prohibition because of the failures
that plague that market-such as information asymmetries, externalities,
and the presence of coercion-and certain moral qualms about the market's
consequences-such as its troubling commodifying effects. If continued
innovation in that market is likely to reduce these market and moral
313. See, e.g., WEITZER, supra note 3 o , at 56 ("[11n cities where it is not already standard
practice, an unwritten policy of nonenforcement might be a sensible innovation.").
314. The classical Willistonian view emphasized formalist ideas of freedom of contract as
enforcing agreements as written. See GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 43 (1974)
(characterizing the Willistonian view); STEPHEN A. SMITH, CONTRACT THEORY 59 (2004)
(defining freedom of contract as "the idea, fundamental in the orthodox understanding of
contract law, that the content of a contractual obligation is a matter for the parties, not the law").
315. For a discussion of Mill's harm principle, see supra note 59.




concerns sufficiently to justify decriminalization or legalization,3'7 the
extant, historical prohibition cannot be a justified reason to inhibit such
innovation. Such a stance would forever condemn black markets by
eliminating any possibility of market evolution.
This freedom of contract argument draws power from concerns about
perpetuating historical forms of stigma and discrimination, particularly
against women, by preventing innovation and thus maintaining the
retrograde nature of prostitution markets. Kimberly Krawiec, Martha
Nussbaum, and Margaret Radin have most clearly articulated components of
this argument. The claim is simple: both commodification and coercion
objections to prostitution fail to achieve their goals-market sales of sex
continue on a massive scale, but in a less humane manner than they would if
legalized. Women are particularly harmed by this state of affairs because
they make up the bulk of the sellers of commercial sex. As Krawiec has put
it:
[T]he restrictions on taboo markets... do not-and are not
intended to-protect sex.., from the incursion of market forces.
Instead, they are asymmetric legal and social restrictions whose
primary purpose and effect is to impede market access by
[primarily female] suppliers of these taboo goods and services, with
resulting societal costs. Meanwhile, market operation continues,
though often in a stunted or dysfunctional manner.
.... [W]hen it comes to taboo markets-and especially taboo
markets involving women's reproductive or sexual labor-we do
not regulate on a clean slate. Instead, the market, social norms,
and prior legal rules are likely to embed class, gender, race, and
other hierarchies that reflect the pre-existing distribution of wealth
and power.3'
5
Rather than using that pre-existing distribution as a grounds for
continuing illegality, however, it is a grounds for liberalization of sex
markets: women find themselves stuck with few options, and banning such
trades only worsens this plight.
My argument here is related to this claim. Again, if we outlaw a given
type of exchange because of its market and moral failures, innovation that
can overcome or eradicate those failures should be permitted else we work
in an impossible circle. More than that general claim, however, about any
317. Decriminalization means removing criminal penalties for the sale of sex. Legalization
means removing criminal penalties for the sale of sex as well as for its purchase or facilitation,
and regulating such sale. See generally Peter de Marneffe, Vice Laws and Self-Sovereignty, 7 CRIM. L.
& PHIL. 29 (2013) (discussing the distinction between decriminalization and legalization).
318. Krawiec, supra note 78, at 1768.
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market, the justification for innovation is particularly strong here: the
retrograde nature of this market has disproportionate negative impacts on
one social group-marginalized women. If improvement in the market can
in turn improve the lot of that group, it seems particularly important to
remove legal barriers to such innovation.
Not all will agree with this incremental reform strategy, of course. Some
will undoubtedly see it as too much too fast, or too little too slow. That said,
let me consider briefly a few of the pragmatic, rather than philosophical,
objections that may remain at this point. Here I consider three such
concerns: that technology always brings peril as well as promise, that
Prostitution 3.0 leaves out street prostitution, and that the argument for
creating Prostitution 3.0 will never garner sufficient political support in the
United States to make it feasible.
1. The Problem of Unexpected Consequences
Technological innovation can create unexpected harms as well as
hoped-for benefits. One cannot know whether encouraging prostitution-
related innovation will do one or the other. Existing technologies are not
perfect: the Internet has created new venues for sexual exploitation
online319 and new means to facilitate sex trafficking offline.320 This suggests
that legalizing the technologies of Prostitution 3.0 may be unwise.
My primary response to such technological skepticism is the empirical
evidence we have about Prostitution 2.0, which suggests that, overall,
technology-enabled prostitutes experience improved working conditions.
The trend seems positive. The justification for decriminalizing prostitution-
related innovation is not that such innovation will be fool-proof. Instead, the
justification derives from the overall positive experience with technology
over the last ten years.
In addition, my proposal is for incremental reform, not immediate
legalization. It is conservative in this sense. If the first steps towards
Prostitution 3.0 fail, and the technological and legal infrastructure does not
materialize to significantly remedy the remaining problems of disease,
319. See generally Donna M. Hughes, Prostitution Online, in PROSTITUTION, TRAFFICKING, AND
TRAUMATIC STRESS 115, 118-20 (Melissa Farley ed., 2003) (arguing that Internet technology
has created new venues for exploitation, including live video sites); Donna Hughes, The Internet
and the Global Prostitution Industry, in CYBERFEMINISM: CONNECTIVITY, CRITIQUE AND CREATIVITY
157 (Susan Hawthorne & Renate Klein eds., 1999) (providing an early critique of the impact of
the Internet on sexual exploitation of women and children); Donna M. Hughes, The Use of New
Communications and Information Technologies for Sexual Exploitation of Women and Children, 13
HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 127 (2002) (focusing on the sale of pictures and video of exploited
women and children).
320. See generally Erin I. Kunze, Note, Sex Trafficking Via the Internet: How International
Agreements Address the Problem and Fail to Go Far Enough, ioJ. HIGH TECH. L. 241 (2010) (arguing
that the Internet has facilitated sex trafficking by providing new means for traffickers to find
and enlist female victims).
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criminal propensity, and trafficking, we can reassess. The goal is an interim
one-to permit and encourage further innovation based on the positive
gains already achieved by existing technological changes to prostitution
markets. If further innovation fails, so be it. We can search for other reform
strategies.
2. The Problem of Remaining Street Prostitution
A second objection is more difficult. Prostitution 3.0 may help
technology-enabled prostitutes and clients avoid disease, violence, and
trafficking, but it will leave out less affluent street prostitutes. Moreover, it
may make their plight worse if a better-informed Prostitution 3.0 market
forces the lowest-quality prostitutes and clients onto the street. Prostitution
i.o can already be brutal, as Part I argued. Prostitution 3.0 may merely
upgrade high-end escort prostitution markets at its expense.
Criminalization of the purchase of sex outside of Prostitution 3.0 offers
some response, but it is obviously imperfect. Although legalizing this one sex
market and penalizing other transactions will help shift demand to
Prostitution 3.0 and away from remaining black markets, such demand will
never drop to zero. What to do about street prostitution?
The short answer is Prostitution 3.5-taking the improvements of
Prostitution 3.0 to the street through location-based mobile technologies. In
the last several years, sophisticated mobile devices have increasingly
integrated Internet information into physical space.32 ' We now live in an
"augmented reality" in which digital information pervades our physical
interactions, informing us about other people, places, and goods in real
time.322 As Prostitution 3.0's information architectures evolve to verify
identity, disease status, trafficking credentials, etc., online, such evolutions
can increasingly be brought to the street and delivered via mobile
technologies.
In particular, mobile location-based matching applications could allow
prostitutes and clients to find each other in physical space without resorting
to the historical signaling methods-such as cruising a particular street
comer-that have often marked real-space matching in this market. In other
words, street prostitution could become far less visible, like Prostitution 2.0's
online forms. Imagine our opening hypothetical, but with the twist that it
occurs in a crowded bar rather than purely online. A prostitute's mobile
device signals to those around her that she is available for hire; their devices
signal interest. Such technology would be invisible to all others in the bar,
but it would permit real-time matching of prostitutes and clients in close
321. See Peppet, supra note 25, at 678-79 (explaining augmented reality technologies and
providing statistics on the ways in which mobile technologies are collapsing the distinction
between physical space and online space).
322. See id. at 688--92.
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proximity. In addition, Prostitution 3.o's verifications and information
checks could occur via such mobile technologies. If, for example, a client
were pre-verified through a Prostitution 3.0 intermediary, a prostitute could
access that information on her phone as easily as if she were sitting at a
computer. With continued development, such mobile applications could
bring increasingly sophisticated information to prostitutes and clients in real
time, in real space.
Such location-based matching technology already exists for dating
services that pair interested parties in real space. Grindr is a popular all-male
location-based smartphone dating app;s2 3 Blendr, from the makers of
Grindr, promises to bring location-based dating services to the heterosexual
population.34 Other location-enabled dating apps, such as MeetMoi,35
similarly make it easy to find available partners near you. These technologies
demonstrate how simply one could create applications to facilitate real-space
matching of prostitutes and clients.3.
6
Such technologies would further shrink the remaining illegal market
for prostitution and increase the reach of Prostitution 3.0's improvements.
Of course some illegal prostitution would continue-there will always be an
unhappy remainder. I cannot offer a perfect solution, only the possibility of
significant improvement over the status quo.
3. The Problem of Political Will
The last objection is the most difficult. The United States has no recent
history of prostitution legalization, decriminalization, or even liberalization.
It is exceedingly difficult to imagine garnering political support for such
reforms.s27 In some instances, the prostitution status quo benefits local
economic actors in ways that incentivize them to combat legalization.2 8 In
323. GRINDR, http://www.grindr.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
324. BLENDR, http://www.blendr.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
325. MEETMOI, http://www.meetmoi.com (last visited Mar. 19, 2013).
326. In May 2011, the web service SugarSugar proposed an iPhone application that would
allow "Sugar Daddies" and "Sugar Babies" to find each other in physical space based on GPS
location information. A Sugar Daddy looking for a date could simply check his smartphone for
the location and profiles of nearby, available SugarSugar users. SugarSugar bills itself as a site
"Where Romance Meets Finance." SUGARSUGAR.COM, http://www.sugarsugar.com (last visited
Mar. 19, 2013). Many assumed that the new mobile application would be used by high-end
escorts. See, e.g., Catalin Alexandru, Apple Approves Prostitution iPhone App?, GEEKY GADGETS (May
14, 2011, 1:26 AM), http://www.geeky-gadgets.com/apple-approves-prostitution-app-o5-i4-
2011/. Although Apple at first approved the iPhone application, it has not yet become
available, suggesting that Apple must have reconsidered.
327. See, e.g., Lance McMillian, Drug Markets, Fringe Markets, and the Lessons of Hamsterdam, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 849, 882--91 (2o 2) (discussing the difficulty of mustering political will to
reform fringe markets).
328. See generally Ashlie C. Warnick, Sex Without Romance: The Political Economy of
Prostitution (Nov. 2007) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=io81624 (arguing that hotel and casino owners in Las Vegas, Nevada
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others, the political sensitivity of the topic of prostitution makes political
reform unlikely.
Many countries have pursued sound prostitution reforms in the last
decades, liberalizing and regulating various forms of indoor prostitution-
such as brothels-while continuing to prohibit street walking.s29 For the
most part, however, these debates over prostitution reform have been largely
academic in the United States. There has been no political will to improve
prostitution markets.33o
I have no simple solution to this problem. Perhaps social norms about
prostitution will shift sufficiently to make such reforms possible on a broad
basis. Educational programs explaining the health, safety, and welfare
benefits of Prostitution 3.0 may help.3s3 My hope is that feminists,
prostitution reformers, and anti-trafficking advocates can join forces to
pursue Prostitution 3.0 as a viable, consensus reform strategy. If so, they
could draw on their powerful respective bases-particularly the anti-
trafficking social movement-to begin to argue for prostitution-related
innovation. If such groups coalesce around Prostitution 3.0 as a solution, we
can at least begin a discussion about its merits, problems, and possibilities.
Finally, Prostitution 3.o's reforms could be undertaken by a single state,
or even a large city. Although some federal law stands in its way,3ss the first
steps towards reform need to occur on a state-by-state basis to decriminalize
prostitution-related technological innovation. This lessens the problem of
political will somewhat-perhaps consensus to try this approach could
emerge in a given geography, even if not nationally. San Francisco may be a
contender: it has a technology-rich economy and some history of
considering prostitution reform.ss3 Or Prostitution 3.0 may first emerge in a
more prostitution-friendly legal context, such as Canada, Britain, or
Australia. If it succeeds in just one location, Prostitution 3.0 may slowly build
momentum and garner sufficient political will to succeed more broadly.
benefit from prohibition because they incur lower employment costs due to kickbacks received
by hotel employees from prostitutes, and therefore that they object to legalization).
329. In an increasing number of countries, including Britain, Canada, New Zealand,
Australia, Germany, and France-payment for sex is now legal, but solicitation, procuring,
advertising, and pimping are not. See TREBILCOCK, supra note 26, at 39-40 (discussing Canada
and other examples).
330. In 2oo9, Rhode Island went the other direction, recriminalizing prostitution after
almost thirty years in which indoor prostitution was decriminalized. See, e.g., Cunningham &
Shah, supra note 175, at 3-5 (explaining the Rhode Island legal regime and policy reversal).
331. See generally Fan, supra note 246 (arguing that shifting norms would allow for the
improvement of disease control, even if politically difficult).
332. See supra notes 240, 275-76 and accompanying text (discussing IRS regulations and
the Communications Decency Act).
333. In 2oo8, San Francisco considered, and ultimately rejected, the Proposition K ballot
initiative to decriminalize prostitution. See Jesse McKinley, San Francisco's Prostitutes Support a
Proposition, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 31, 2008), www.nytimes.com/2oo8/1 /o /us/oi prostitute.html.
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CONCLUSION
Prostitution is changing. Internet technologies have improved it,
making high-end forms of indoor, independent prostitution safer, healthier,
and more rewarding. It has not changed enough, however. Further
technological innovation provides a new avenue for effective prostitution
reform. Coupled with smart legal changes to bolster such technological
innovation, Prostitution 3.0 could usher in a new, better sex market that
solves many of prostitution's basic problems.
